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Wireless communication technology has proved to be one of the most fundamental
modern technologies affecting our daily lives. This is amplified by a wide variety
of emerging applications. As we all know wireless spectrum is limited and with
growing need and applications of wireless communication systems, interference will
be one of the most serious challenges ahead if not the foremost hurdle in achieving
widespread applications of wireless systems. This includes wireless sensor networks
(WSN) and mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). There have been several methods
proposed for overcoming spectrum limitations; one of the more recent development
is the idea of open access, whereby secondary users or unlicensed users are allowed
access to spectrum licensed to other, primary users when it is not in active use. This
leads to the notion of cognitive radio, a wireless transceiver that is highly agile and
spectrum aware and thus can take advantage of instantaneous spectrum availability
to dynamically access radio frequencies to perform data transmission. This has been
an area of extensive research in recent years.
The overarching theme of this thesis is the investigation of good opportunistic
spectrum access and sharing schemes within the above context using a resource
allocation framework. The two main analytical approaches taken in this thesis are a
1
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stochastic optimization based approach and a game theoretic approach.
Using the first approach we study an optimal channel sensing and access problem
from the point of view of a single (secondary) user. Activities of primary users and
possibly other secondary users are modeled as part of a channel of time-varying
availability perceived by this single user. With this assumption, the objective is for
the user to determine at each instance of time (under a discrete time model) which
(subset of) channel(s) to sense – the ones sensed available can subsequently be used
for data transmission – so as to maximize its total reward over a finite or infinite
horizon. A key assumption here is that the user is limited in its channel sensing
capability in that it can only sense a small number of channels at a time compared
to the total number of channels available. It must therefore make judicious decisions
on which channels to sense over time to maximize its transmission opportunity. This
problem is further separated into two cases, where the user is limited to sense one
channel at a time, and where the user can sense more than one channel at a time.
These constitute the first two technical chapters of this thesis.
Using the second, game theoretic approach we study a spectrum sharing problem
in the presence of a group of peer (secondary) users. This is formulated as a general-
ized form of the classical congestion game, referred to as a network congestion game
in this thesis: a group of wireless users share a set of common channels, each tries
to find the best channel for itself, and the utility of a channel depends not only on
the channel itself but also on how many interfering users are simultaneously using
it. This constitutes the third technical chapter of this thesis.
Below we describe each of these two problems in more detail along with our main
results and contributions.
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1.1 Problem 1: Opportunistic Spectrum Access as a Restless Bandit
Problem
This problem (referred to as optimal probing or OP) concerns the opportunistic
communication over multiple channels where the state (“good” or “bad”) of each
channel evolves as independent and identically distributed Markov processes. A
user, with limited channel sensing capability, chooses one channel to sense and sub-
sequently access (based on the sensing result) in each time slot. A reward is obtained
whenever the user senses and accesses a “good” channel. The objective is to design
a channel selection policy that maximizes the expected total (discounted or aver-
age) reward accrued over a finite or infinite horizon. This problem can be cast as a
Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP) or a restless multi-armed
bandit process, to which optimal solutions are often intractable.
This problem was first introduced by Zhao [1] where they established the optimal-
ity of a simple greedy policy – always sensing the channel that has the highest current
probability of being available – for the simple case of 2 channels. The approach they
used was based on proving the problem by proving optimality of greedy policy al-
most surely (path wise) for all possible consecutive outcomes of channel states. That
approach was not useful for the case of more than 2 channels as myopic policy is no
longer path wise optimal (almost surely), so a new approach had to be introduced.
The idea that we used was to define a function based on the order of channels played
(not necessarily depending on their ranking) and then use a coupling argument to
prove that this function achieves its maximum value if channels are played in the
order of their ranks. This proved the optimality of the myopic policy in the general
case of multiple channels.
Our main results and contributions are as follows: For the finite horizon dis-
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counted reward case, we show that the same myopic policy that maximizes the
immediate one-step reward is optimal when the channel state transitions are posi-
tively correlated over time. When the state transitions are negatively correlated, it
is shown that the same policy is optimal when the number of channels is limited
to 2 or 3, while presenting a counterexample for the case of 4 channels. The same
optimality result is then extended to the case of infinite horizon discounted reward
and average reward cases.
We further extended this problem to the case of allowing the users to sense a fixed
number (more than one) of channels at a time (referred to as multi-channel optimal
probing, or MC-OP). We proved the optimality of the same greedy policy under the
same bursty channel condition.
In both the single-play and multiple-play cases, the greedy policy depends only
on the ordering of the channel occupancy probabilities. Therefor it is fairly robust
to the knowledge of initial probabilities as long as the order of channel occupancies
are preserved .
1.2 Problem 2: Opportunistic Spectrum Sharing as a Congestion Game
In this problem we turned our attention to the case where multiple users wish
to efficiently share multiple channels. Each user may only use one channel at a
time, and each channel may present different value to different users. However, the
value of any channel to a user decreases as it is shared by more interfering users. The
interference relationship among users is represented by a graph. This is modeled as a
network congestion game (NCG), which is a generalization of the classical congestion
game (CG). In a classical congestion game [2], multiple users share the same set of
resources and a user’s payoff for using any resource is a function of the total number
5
of users sharing it. This game enjoys some very appealing properties, including the
existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (NE) and that every improvement path
is finite and leads to such a NE (also called the finite improvement property or FIP),
which is also a local optimum to a potential function. On the other hand, it does not
model well spectrum sharing and spatial reuse in a wireless network, where resources
(interpreted as channels) may be reused without increasing congestion provided that
users are located far away from each other. This motivates to study an extended
form of the congestion game where a user’s payoff for using a channel is a function
of the number of its interfering users sharing that channel, rather than the total
number of users using the channel. This naturally leads to a network congestion
game, whereby users are placed over a network (or a conflict graph).
Our main results and contributions are as follows. We study fundamental prop-
erties of the above network congestion game; in particular, we seek to answer under
what conditions on the underlying network this game possesses the FIP or a NE. In
case that number of channels is exactly two, we proved the problem has the finite
improvement property (FIP) property; as a result, a Nash equilibrium always exists
for any underlying graph, that any greedy updating strategy by the users will lead
to such an equilibrium. We then proved by a counter-example that when there exist
three or more channels, the problem does not have the finite improvement property
so the game will not be a potential game. We also proved that for certain special
types of graph, in the form of a tree or a loop, an NE exists. Finally, we showed that
when the channels are equally perceived by any user (need not be the same for all
users), this game has an exact potential function so that both the NE and the FIP
property exist.
6
1.3 Organization of Dissertation
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 we study the first
problem, opportunistic spectrum access in the case of sensing one channel at a time.
The more general case, multiple channel sensing is studied in Chapter 3. Then in
Chapter 4 we study the network congestion game for opportunistic spectrum sharing.
We conclude the thesis in Chapter 5.
CHAPTER 2
Opportunistic Spectrum Access as a Restless Bandit
Problem
2.1 Introduction
We consider a communication system in which a sender has access to multiple
channels, but is limited to sensing and transmitting only on one at a given time. We
explore how a smart sender should exploit past observations and the knowledge of
the stochastic state evolution of these channels to maximize its transmission rate by
switching opportunistically across channels.
We model this problem in the following manner. As shown in Figure 1, there are
n channels, each of which evolves as an independent, identically-distributed, two-
state discrete-time Markov chain. The two states for each channel — “good” (or
state 1) and “bad” (or state 0) — indicate the desirability of transmitting over that
channel at a given time slot. The state transition probabilities are given by pij,
i, j = 0, 1. In each time slot the sender picks one of the channels to sense based
on its prior observations, and obtains some fixed reward if it is in the good state.
The basic objective of the sender is to maximize the reward that it can gain over a
given finite time horizon. This problem can be described as a partially observable
Markov decision process (POMDP) [3] since the states of the underlying Markov
chains are not fully observed. It can also be cast as a special case of the class of
7
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Figure 2.1: The Markov channel model.
This formulation is broadly applicable to several domains. It arises naturally in
opportunistic spectrum access (OSA) [5, 6], where the sender is a secondary user, and
the channel states describe the occupancy by primary users. In the OSA problem,
the secondary sender may send on a given channel only when there is no primary user
occupying it. It pertains to communication over parallel fading channels as well, if
a two-state Markovian fading model is employed. Another interesting application of
this formulation is in the domain of communication security, where it can be used to
develop bounds on the performance of resource-constrained jamming. A jammer that
has access to only one channel at a time could also use the same stochastic dynamic
decision making process to maximize the number of times that it can successfully
jam communications that occur on these channels. In this application, the “good”
state for the jammer is precisely when the channel is being utilized by other senders
(in contrast with the OSA problem).
In this chapter we examine the optimality of a simple myopic policy for the op-
portunistic access problem outlined above. Specifically, we show that the myopic
policy is optimal for arbitrary n when p11 ≥ p01. We also show that it is optimal
for n = 3 when p11 < p01, while presenting a finite horizon counter example showing
that it is in general not optimal for n ≥ 4. We also generalize these results to related
9
formulations involving discounted and average rewards over an infinite horizon.
These results extend and complement those reported in prior work [7]. Specifi-
cally, it has been shown in [7] that for all n the myopic policy has an elegant and
robust structure that obviates the need to know the channel state transition proba-
bilities and reduces channel selection to a simple round robin procedure. Based on
this structure, the optimality of the myopic policy for n = 2 was established and the
performance of the myopic policy, in particular, the scaling property with respect
to n, analyzed in [7]. It was conjectured in [7] that the myopic policy is optimal
for any n. This conjecture was partially addressed in a preliminary conference ver-
sion [8], where the optimality was established under certain restrictive conditions on
the channel parameters and the discount factor. In the present chapter, we signifi-
cantly relax these conditions and formerly prove this conjecture under the condition
p11 ≥ p01. We also provide a counter example for p11 < p01.
We would like to emphasize that compared to earlier work [7, 8], the approach
used in this chapter relies on a coupling argument, which is the key to extending
the optimality result to the arbitrary n case. Earlier techniques were largely based
on exploiting the convex analytic properties of the value function, and were shown
to have difficulty in overcoming the n = 2 barrier without further conditions on the
discount factor or transition probabilities. This observation is somewhat reminis-
cent of the results reported in [9], where a coupling argument was also used to solve
an n-queue problem while earlier versions [10] using value function properties were
limited to a 2-queue case. We invite the interested reader to refer to [11], an impor-
tant manuscript on monotonicity in MDPs which explores the power as well as the
limitation of working with analytic properties of value functions and dynamic pro-
gramming operators as we had done in our earlier work. In particular, [11, Section
10
9.5] explores the difficulty of using such techniques for multi-dimensional problems
where the number of queues is more than n = 2; [11, Chapter 12] contrasts this proof
technique with the stochastic coupling arguments, which our present work uses.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. We formulate the problem
in Section 2.2 and illustrate the myopic policy in Section 2.3. In Section 2.4, we prove
that the myopic policy is optimal in the case of p11 ≥ p01, and show in Section 2.5 that
it is in general not optimal when this condition does not hold. Section 2.6 extends
the results from finite horizon to infinite horizon. We discuss our work within the
context of the class of restless bandit problems as well as some related work in this
area in Section 2.7. Section 2.8 concludes the chapter.
2.2 Problem Formulation
We consider the scenario where a user is trying to access the wireless spectrum
to maximize its throughput or data rate. The spectrum consists of n independent
and statistically identical channels. The state of a channel is given by a two-state
discrete time Markov chain shown in Figure 2.1.
The system operates in discrete time steps indexed by t, t = 1, 2, · · · , T , where
T is the time horizon of interest. At time t−, the channels (i.e., the Markov chains
representing them) go through state transitions, and at time t the user makes the
channel sensing and access decision. Specifically, at time t the user selects one of
the n channels to sense, say channel i. If the channel is sensed to be in the “good”
state (state 1), the user transmits and collects one unit of reward. Otherwise the
user does not transmit (or transmits at a lower rate), collects no reward, and waits
until t + 1 to make another choice. This process repeats sequentially until the time
horizon expires.
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As mentioned earlier, this abstraction is primarily motivated by the following
multi-channel access scenario where a secondary user seeks spectrum opportunity
in between a primary user’s activities. Specifically, time is divided into frames and
at the beginning of each frame there is a designated time slot for the primary user
to reserve that frame and for secondary users to perform channel sensing. If a
primary user intends to use a frame it will simply remain active in a channel (or
multiple channels) during that sensing time slot (i.e., reservation is by default for
a primary user in use of the channel), in which case a secondary user will find the
channel(s) busy and not attempt to use it for the duration of that frame. If the
primary user is inactive during this sensing time slot, then the remainder of the
frame is open to secondary users. Such a structure provides the necessary protection
for the primary user as channel sensing (in particular active channel sensing that
involves communication between a pair of users) conducted at arbitrary times can
cause undesirable interference.
Within such a structure, a secondary user has a limited amount of time and
capability to perform channel sensing, and may only be able to sense one or a subset
of the channels before the sensing time slot ends. And if all these channels are
unavailable then it will have to wait till the next sensing time slot. In this chapter
we will limit our attention to the special case where the secondary user only has
the resources to sense one channel within this slot. Conceptually our formulation is
easily extended to the case where the secondary user can sense multiple channels at
a time within this structure, although the corresponding results differ, see e.g., [12].
Note that in this formulation we do not explicitly model the cost of channel
sensing; it is implicit in the fact that the user is limited in how many channels it can
sense at a time. Alternative formulations have been studied where sensing costs are
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explicitly taken into consideration in a user’s sensing and access decision, see e.g.,
[13] and [14].
In this formulation we have assumed that sensing errors are negligible. Techniques
used in this chapter may be applicable in proving the optimality of the myopic policy
under imperfect sensing and for a general number of channels. The reason behind this
is that our proof exploits the simple structure of the myopic policy, which remains
when sensing is subject to errors as shown in [15].
Note that the system is not fully observable to the user, i.e., the user does not know
the exact state of the system when making the sensing decision. Specifically, channels
go through state transition at time t− (or anytime between (t− 1, t)), thus when the
user makes the channel sensing decision at time t, it does not have the true state of
the system at time t, which we denote by s(t) = [s1(t), s2(t), · · · , sn(t)] ∈ {0, 1}n.
Furthermore, even after its action (at time t+) it only gets to observe the true state
of one channel, which goes through another transition at or before time (t + 1)−.
The user’s action space at time t is given by the finite set {1, 2, · · · , n}, and we will
use a(t) = i to denote that the user selects channel i to sense at time t. For clarity,
we will denote the outcome/observation of channel sensing at time t following the
action a(t) by ha(t)(t), which is essentially the true state sa(t)(t) of channel a(t) at
time t since we assume channel sensing to be error-free.
It can be shown (see e.g., [3, 16, 17]) that a sufficient statistic of such a system
for optimal decision making, or the information state of the system [16, 17], is given
by the conditional probabilities of the state each channel is in given all past actions
and observations. Since each channel can be in one of two states, we denote this
information state or belief vector by ω̄(t) = [ω1(t), · · · , ωn(t)] ∈ [0, 1]n, where ωi(t) is
the conditional probability that channel i is in state 1 at time t given all past states,
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actions and observations 1. Throughout the chapter ωi(t) will be referred to as the
information state of channel i at time t, or simply the channel probability of i at
time t.
Due to the Markovian nature of the channel model, the future information state
is only a function of the current information state and the current action; i.e., it is
independent of past history given the current information state and action. It follows
that the information state of the system evolves as follows. Given that the state at
time t is ω̄(t) and action a(t) = i is taken, ωi(t + 1) can take on two values: (1) p11
if the observation is that channel i is in a “good” state (hi(t) = 1); this occurs with
probability P{hi(t) = 1|ω̄(t)} = ωi(t); (2) p01 if the observation is that channel i is
in a “bad” state (hi(t) = 0); this occurs with probability P{hi(t) = 0|ω̄(t)} = 1−ωi.
For any other channel j 6= i, the corresponding ωj(t + 1) can only take on one value
(i.e., with probability 1): ωj(t + 1) = τ(ωj(t)) where the operator τ : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is
defined as
(2.1) τ(ω) := ωp11 + (1− ω)p01, 0 ≤ ω ≤ 1.
These transition probabilities are summarized in the following equation for t =
1, 2, · · · , T − 1:





p11 with prob. ωi(t) if a(t) = i
p01 with prob. 1− ωi(t) if a(t) = i
τ(ωi(t)) with prob. 1 if a(t) 6= i
, i = 1, 2, · · · , n,(2.2)
Also note that ω̄(1) ∈ [0, 1]n denotes the initial condition (information state in the
form of conditional probabilities) of the system, which may be interpreted as the the
1Note that this is a standard way of turning a POMDP problem into a classic MDP (Markov decision process)
problem by means of information state, the main implication being that the state space is now uncountable.
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user’s initial belief about how likely each channel is in the good state before sensing
starts at time t = 1. For the purpose of the optimization problems formulated below,
this initial condition is considered given, which can be any probability vector 2.
It is important to note that although in general a POMDP problem has an un-
countable state space (information states are probability distributions), in our prob-
lem the state space is countable for any given initial condition ω̄(1). This is because
as shown above, the information state of any channel with an initial probability of ω
can only take on the values {ω, τ k(ω), p01, τ k(ω), p11, τ k(ω)}, where k = 1, 2, · · · and
τ k(ω) := τ(τ k−1(ω)), which is a countable set.
For compactness of presentation we will further use the operator τ to denote the
above probability distribution of the information state (the entire vector):
ω̄(t + 1) = τ(ω̄(t), a(t)),(2.3)
by noting that the operation given in (2.2) is applied to ω̄(t) element-by-element. We
will also use the following to denote the information state given observation outcome:
τ(ω̄(t), a(t)|ha(t)(t) = 1) =(2.4)
(τ(ω1(t)), · · · , τ(ωa(t)−1(t)), p11, τ(ωa(t)+1(t)), · · · , τ(ωn(t)))(2.5)
τ(ω̄(t), a(t)|ha(t)(t) = 0)(2.6)
= (τ(ω1(t)), · · · , τ(ωa(t)−1(t)), p01, τ(ωa(t)+1(t)), · · · , τ(ωn(t)))(2.7)
The objective of the user is to maximize its total (discounted or average) expected
reward over a finite (or infinite) horizon. Let JπT (ω̄), J
π
β (ω̄), and J
π
∞(ω̄) denote,
respectively, these cost criteria (namely, finite horizon, infinite horizon with discount,
and infinite horizon average reward) under policy π starting in state ω̄ = [ω1, · · · , ωn].
2That is, the optimal solutions are functions of the initial condition. A reasonable choice, if the user has no special
information other than the transition probabilities of these channels, is to simply use the steady-state probabilities





The associated optimization problems ((P1)-(P3)) are formally defined as follows.
(P1): max
π


























where β (0 ≤ β ≤ 1 for (P1) and 0 ≤ β < 1 for (P2)) is the discount factor,
and Rπt(ω̄(t)) is the reward collected under state ω̄(t) when channel a(t) = πt(ω̄(t))
is selected and ha(t)(t) is observed. This reward is given by Rπt(ω̄(t)) = 1 with
probability ωa(t)(t) (when ha(t)(t) = 1), and 0 otherwise.
The maximization in (P1) is over the class of deterministic Markov policies.3. An
admissible policy π, given by the vector π = [π1, π2, · · · , πT ], is thus such that πt
specifies a mapping from the current information state ω̄(t) to a channel selection
action a(t) = πt(ω̄(t)) ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}. This is done without loss of optimality due
to the Markovian nature of the underlying system, and due to known results on
POMDPs. Note that the class of Markov policies in terms of information state are
also known as seperated policies (see [17]). Due to finiteness of (unobservable) state
spaces and action space in problem (P1), it is known that an optimal policy (over all
random and deterministic, history-dependent and history-independent policies) may
be found within the class of separated (i.e. deterministic Markov) policies (see e.g.,
[17, Theorem 7.1, Chapter 6]), thus justifying the maximization and the admissible
policy space.
In Section 2.6 we establish the existence of a stationary separated policy π∗, under
which the supremum of the expected discounted reward as well as the supremum of
3A Markov policy is a policy that derives its action only depending on the current (information) state, rather
than the entire history of states, see e.g., [17].
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expected average cost are achieved, hence justifying our use of maximization in (P2)
and (P3). Furthermore, it is shown that under this policy the limit in (P3) exists
and is greater than the limsup of the average performance of any other policy (in
general history-dependent and randomized). This is a strong notion of optimality;
the interpretation is that the most “pessimistic” average performance under policy




T (·) = lim 1T Jπ
∗
T (·)) is greater than the most “optimistic” performance
under any other policy π (lim sup 1
T
JπT (·)). In much of the literature on MDP, this is
referred to as the strong optimality for an expected average cost (reward) problem;
for a discussion on this, see [18, Page 344].
2.3 Optimal Policy and the Myopic Policy
2.3.1 Dynamic Programming Representations
Problems (P1)-(P3) defined in the previous section may be solved using their
respective dynamic programming (DP) representations. Specifically, for problem
(P1), we have the following recursive equations:





E[Ra(ω̄) + βVt+1(τ(ω̄, a))]
= max
a=1,··· ,n
(ωa + βωaVt+1 (τ (ω̄, a|1)) + β(1− ωa)Vt+1 (τ (ω̄, a|0))) ,(2.8)
for t = 1, 2, · · · , T − 1, where Vt(ω̄) is known as the value function, or the maximum
expected future reward that can be accrued starting from time t when the information
state is ω̄. In particular, we have V1(ω̄) = maxπ J
π
T (ω̄), and an optimal deterministic
Markov policy exists such that a = π∗t (ω̄) achieves the maximum in (2.8) (see e.g.,
[18] (Chapter 4)). Note that since T is a conditional probability distribution (given
in (2.3)), Vt+1(T (ω̄, a)) is taken to be the expectation over this distribution when its
argument is T , with a slight abuse of notation, as expressed in (2.8).
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Similar dynamic programming representations hold for (P2) and (P3) as given




E[Ra(ω̄) + βVβ(τ(ω̄, a))]
= max
a=1,··· ,n
(ωa + βωaVβ (τ (ω̄, a|1)) + β(1− ωa)Vβ (τ (ω̄, a|0))) .(2.9)
We have that Vβ(ω̄) = maxπ J
π
β (ω̄), and that a stationary separated policy π
∗ is
optimal if and only if a = π∗(ω̄) achieves the maximum in (2.9) [19, Theorem 7.1].
For problem (P3), we will show that there exist a bounded function h∞(·) and a
constant scalar J satisfying the following equation:
J + h∞(ω̄) = max
a=1,2,··· ,n
E[Ra(ω̄) + h∞(τ(ω̄, a))]
= max
a=1,··· ,n
(ωa + ωah∞ (τ (ω̄, a|1)) + (1− ωa)h∞ (τ (ω̄, a|0))).(2.10)
The boundedness of h∞ and the immediate reward implies that J = maxπ Jπ∞(ω̄), and
that a stationary separated policy π∗ is optimal in the context of (P3) if a = π∗(ω̄)
achieves the maximum in (2.10) [19, Theorems 6.1-6.3].
Solving (P1)-(P3) using the above recursive equations is in general computation-
ally heavy. Therefore, instead of directly using the DP equations, the focus of this
chapter is on examining the optimality properties of a simple, greedy algorithm. We
define this algorithm next and show its simplicity in structure and implementation.
2.3.2 The Myopic Policy
A myopic or greedy policy ignores the impact of the current action on the future
reward, focusing solely on maximizing the expected immediate reward. Myopic poli-
cies are thus stationary. For (P1), the myopic policy under state ω̄ = [ω1, ω2, · · · , ωn]
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is given by
(2.11) a∗(ω̄) = arg max
a=1,··· ,n
E[Ra(ω̄)] = arg max
a=1,··· ,n
ωa.
In general, obtaining the myopic action in each time slot requires the succes-
sive update of the information state as given in (2.2), which explicitly relies on the
knowledge of the transition probabilities {pij} as well as the initial condition ω̄(1).
Interestingly, it has been shown in [7] that the implementation of the myopic policy
requires only the knowledge of the initial condition and the order of p11 and p01, but
not the precise values of these transition probabilities. To make the present chapter
self-contained, below we briefly describe how this policy works; more details may be
found in [7].
Specifically, when p11 ≥ p01 the conditional probability updating function τ(ω)
is a monotonically increasing function, i.e., τ(ω1) ≥ τ(ω2) for ω1 ≥ ω2. Therefore
the ordering of information states among channels is preserved when they are not
observed. If a channel has been observed to be in state “1” (respectively “0”), its
probability at the next step becomes p11 ≥ τ(ω) (respectively p01 ≤ τ(ω)) for any
ω ∈ [0, 1]. In other words, a channel observed to be in state “1” (respectively “0”) will
have the highest (respectively lowest) possible information state among all channels.
These observations lead to the following implementation of the myopic policy.
We take the initial information state ω̄(1), order the channels according to their
probabilities ωi(1), and probe the highest one (top of the ordered list) with ties
broken randomly. In subsequent steps we stay in the same channel if the channel
was sensed to be in state “1” (good) in the previous slot; otherwise, this channel
is moved to the bottom of the ordered list, and we probe the channel currently at
the top of the list. This in effect creates a round robin style of probing, where the
channels are cycled through in a fixed order. This circular structure is exploited in
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Section 2.4 to prove the optimality of the myopic policy in the case of p11 ≥ p01.
When p11 < p01, we have an analogous but opposite situation. The conditional
probability updating function τ(ω) is now a monotonically decreasing function, i.e.,
τ(ω1) ≤ τ(ω2) for ω1 ≥ ω2. Therefore the ordering of information states among
channels is reversed at each time step when they are not observed. If a channel
has been observed to be in state “1” (respectively “0”), its probability at the next
step becomes p11 ≤ τ(ω) (respectively p01 ≥ τ(ω)) for any ω ∈ [0, 1]. In other
words, a channel observed to be in state “1” (respectively “0”) will have the lowest
(respectively highest) possible information state among all channels.
As in the previous case, these similar observations lead to the following imple-
mentation. We take the initial information state ω̄(1), order the channels according
to their probabilities ωi(1), and probe the highest one (top of the ordered list) with
ties broken randomly. In each subsequent step, if the channel sensed in the previous
step was in state “0” (bad), we keep this channel at the top of the list but completely
reverse the order of the remaining list, and we probe this channel. If the channel
sensed in the previous step was in state “1” (good), then we completely reverse the
order of the entire list (including dropping this channel to the bottom of the list), and
probe the channel currently at the top of the list. This alternating circular structure
is exploited in Section 2.5 to examine the optimality of the myopic policy in the case
of p11 < p01.
2.4 Optimality of the Myopic Policy in the Case of p11 ≥ p01
In this section we show that the myopic policy, with a simple and robust structure,
is optimal when p11 ≥ p01. We will first show this for the finite horizon discounted cost
case, and then extend the result to the infinite horizon case under both discounted
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and average cost criteria in Section 2.6.
The main assumption is formally stated as follows.
Assumption 2.1. The transition probabilities p01 and p11 are such that
p11 − p01 ≥ 0.(2.12)
The main theorem of this section is as follows.
Theorem 2.2. Consider Problem (P1). Define Vt(ω̄; a) := E[Ra(ω̄)+βVt+1(T (ω̄, a))],
i.e., the value of the value function given in Eqn (2.8) when action a is taken at time
t followed by an optimal policy. Under Assumption 2.1, the myopic policy is optimal,
i.e. for ∀t, 1 ≤ t < T , and ∀ω̄ = [ω1, · · · , ωn] ∈ [0, 1]n,
(2.13) Vt(ω̄; a = j)− Vt(ω̄; a = i) ≥ 0,
if ωj ≥ ωi, for i = 1, · · · , n.
The proof of this theorem is based on backward induction on t: given the opti-
mality of the myopic policy at times t+1, t+2, · · · , T , we want to show that it is also
optimal at time t. This relies on a number of lemmas introduced below. The first
lemma introduces a notation that allows us to express the expected future reward
under the myopic policy.
Lemma 2.3. There exist T n-variable functions, denoted by Wt(), t = 1, 2, · · · , T ,
each of which is a polynomial of order 14 and can be represented recursively in the
following form:
(2.14)
Wt(ω̄) = ωn+ωnβWt+1(τ(ω1), . . . , τ(ωn−1), p11)+(1−ωn)βWt+1(p01, τ(ω1), . . . , τ(ωn−1)),
where ω̄ = [ω1, ω2, · · · , ωn] and WT (ω̄) = ωn.
4Each function Wt is affine in each variable, when all other variables are held constant.
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Proof. The proof is easily obtained using backward induction on t given the above
recursive equation and noting that WT () is one such polynomial and the mapping
τ() is a linear operation.
Corollary 1. When ω̄ represents the ordered list of information states [ω1, ω2, · · · , ωn]
with ω1 ≤ ω2 ≤ · · · ≤ ωn, then Wt(ω̄) is the expected total reward obtained by the
myopic policy from time t on.
Proof. This result follows directly from the description of the policy given in Section
2.3.2.
When ω̄ is the ordered list of information states, the recursive expression in (2.14)
gives the expected reward of the following policy: probe the n-th channel; for the
next step, if the current sensing outcome is “1”, then continue to probe the n-th
channel; if the current sensing outcome is “0”, then drop this channel to the bottom
of the list (it becomes the first channel) while moving the i-th channel to the (i+1)-
th position for all i = 1, · · · , n− 1; repeat this process. (This is essentially the same
description as given in Section 2.3 for the case of p11 ≥ p01.) To see that this is
the myopic policy, note that under the above policy, at any time the list of channel
probabilities are increasingly ordered. This is because for any 0 ≤ ω ≤ 1, we have
p01 ≤ τ(ω) ≤ p11 when p11 ≥ p01. Furthermore, under the assumption p11 ≥ p01, τ(ω)
is a monotonically increasing function. Therefore under this policy, when starting
out with increasingly ordered information states, this ordered is maintained in each
subsequent time step. As expressed in (2.14), at each step it’s always the n-th channel
that is probed. Since the n-th channel has the largest probability of being available,
this is the myopic policy.
Proposition 2.4. The fact that Wt is a polynomial of order 1 and affine in each of
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its elements implies that
Wt(ω1, · · · , ωn−2, y, x)−Wt(ω1, · · · , ωn−2, x, y)
= (x− y)[Wt(ω1, · · · , ωn−2, 0, 1)−Wt(ω1, · · · , ωn−2, 1, 0)] .(2.15)
Similar results hold when we change the positions of x and y.
To see this, consider Wt(ω1, · · · , ωn−2, x, y) and Wt(ω1, · · · , ωn−2, y, x), as func-
tions of x and y, each having an x term, a y term, an xy term and a constant term.
Since we are just swapping the positions of x and y in these two functions, the con-
stant term remains the same, and so does the xy term. Thus the only difference is
the x term and the y term, as given in the above equation. This linearity result will
be used later in our proofs.
The next lemma establishes a necessary and sufficient condition for the optimality
of the myopic policy.
Lemma 2.5. Consider Problem (P1) and Assumption 1. Given the optimality of
the myopic policy at times t + 1, t + 2, · · · , T , the optimality at time t is equivalent
to:
Wt(ω1, . . . , ωi−1, ωi+1, . . . , ωn, ωi) ≤ Wt(ω1, . . . , ωn),(2.16)
for all ω1 ≤ · · · ≤ ωi ≤ · · · ≤ ωn.
Proof. Since the myopic policy is optimal from t + 1 on, it is sufficient to show that
probing ωn followed by myopic probing is better than probing any other channel
followed by myopic probing. The former is precisely given by the RHS of the above
equation; the latter by the LHS, thus completing the proof.
Having established that Wt(ω̄) is the total expected reward of the myopic policy
for an increasingly-ordered vector ω̄ = [ω1, · · · , ωn], we next proceed to show that
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we do not decrease this total expected reward Wt(ω̄) by switching the order of two
neighboring elements ωi and ωi+1 if ωi ≥ ωi+1. This is done in two separate cases,
when i + 1 < n (given in Lemma 2.7) and when i + 1 = n (given in Lemma 2.8),
respectively. The first case is quite straightforward, while proving the second cased
turned out to be significantly more difficult. Our proof of the second case (Lemma
2.8) relies on a separate lemma (Lemma 2.6) that establishes a bound between the
greedy use of two identical vectors but with a different starting position. The proof
of Lemma 2.6 is based on a coupling argument and is quite instructive. Below we
present and prove Lemmas 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8.
Lemma 2.6. For 0 < ω1 ≤ ω2 ≤ . . . ≤ ωn < 1 , we have the following inequality for
all t = 1, 2, · · · , T :
1 + Wt(ω2, . . . , ωn, ω1) ≥ Wt(ω1, . . . , ωn).(2.17)
Proof. This lemma is the key to our main result and its proof is by using coupling
argument along any sample path. It is however also lengthy, and for this reason has
been relegated to the Appendix.
Lemma 2.7. For all j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n− 3, and all x ≥ y, we have
Wt(ω1, . . . , ωj, x, y, . . . , ωn) ≤ Wt(ω1, . . . , ωj, y, x, . . . , ωn)(2.18)
Proof. We prove this by induction over t. The claim is obviously true for t = T ,
since both sides will be equal to ωn, thereby establishing the induction basis. Now
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suppose the claim is true for all t + 1, · · · , T − 1. We have
Wt(ω1, · · · , ωj−1, x, y, · · · , ωn)
= ωn(1 + βWt+1(τ(ω1), · · · , τ(x), τ(y), · · · , τ(ωn−1), p11))
+ (1− ωn)βWt+1(p01, τ(ω1), · · · , τ(x), τ(y), · · · , τ(ωn−1))
≤ ωn(1 + βWt+1(τ(ω1), · · · , τ(y), τ(x), · · · , τ(ωn−1), p11))
+ (1− ωn)βWt+1(p01, τ(ω1), · · · , τ(y), τ(x), · · · , τ(ωn−1))
= Wt(ω1, · · · , ωj−1, y, x, · · · , ωn)(2.19)
where the inequality is due to the induction hypothesis, and noting that τ() is a
monotone increasing mapping in the case of p11 ≥ p01.
Lemma 2.8. For all x ≥ y, we have
Wt(ω1, . . . , ωj, . . . , ωn−2, x, y) ≤ Wt(ω1, . . . , ωj, . . . , ωn−2, y, x).(2.20)
Proof. This lemma is proved inductively. The claim is obviously true for t = T .
Assume it also holds for times t + 1, · · · , T − 1. We have by the definition of Wt()
and due to its linearity property:
Wt(ω1, . . . , ωn−2, y, x)−Wt(ω1, . . . , ωn−2, x, y)
= (x− y)(Wt(ω1, . . . , ωn−2, 0, 1)−Wt(ω1, . . . , ωn−2, 1, 0))
= (x− y) (1 + βWt+1(τ(ω1), . . . , τ(ωn−2), p01, p11)− βWt+1(p01, τ(ω1), . . . , τ(ωn−2), p11)) .
But from the induction hypothesis we know that
Wt+1(τ(ω1), . . . , τ(ωn−2), p01, p11) ≥ Wt+1(τ(ω1), . . . , τ(ωn−2), p11, p01)(2.21)
This means that
1 + βWt+1(τ(ω1), . . . , τ(ωn−2), p01, p11)− βWt+1(p01, τ(ω1), . . . , τ(ωn−2), p11)
≥ 1 + βWt+1(τ(ω1), . . . , τ(ωn−2), p11, p01)− βWt+1(p01, τ(ω1), . . . , τ(ωn−2), p11) ≥ 0 ,
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where the last inequality is due to Lemma 2.6 (note that in that lemma we proved
1 + A ≥ B, which obviously implies 1 + βA ≥ βB for 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 that is used above).
This, together with the condition x ≥ y, completes the proof.
We are now ready to prove the main theorem.
Proof of Theorem 2.2: The basic approach is by induction on t. The optimality
of the myopic policy at time t = T is obvious. So the induction basis is established.
Now assume that the myopic policy is optimal for all times t + 1, t + 2, · · · , T − 1,
and we will show that it is also optimal at time t. By Lemma 2.5 this is equivalent
to establishing the following
Wt(ω1, . . . , ωi−1, ωi+1, . . . , ωn, ωi) ≤ Wt(ω1, . . . , ωn).(2.22)
But we know from Lemmas 2.7 and 2.8 that,
Wt(ω1, . . . , ωi−1, ωi+1, . . . , ωn, ωi) ≤ Wt(ω1, . . . , ωi−1, ωi+1, . . . , ωi, ωn)
≤ Wt(ω1, . . . , ωi−1, ωi+1, . . . , ωi, ωn−1, ωn) ≤ . . . ≤ Wt(ω1, . . . , ωn) ,
where the first inequality is the result of Lemma 2.8, while the remaining inequalities
are repeated application of Lemma 2.7, completing the proof.
We would like to emphasize that from a technical point of view, Lemma 2.6 is
the key to the whole proof: it leads to Lemma 2.8, which in turn leads to Theorem
2.2. While Lemma 2.8 was easy to conceptualize as a sufficient condition to prove
the main theorem, Lemma 2.6 was much more elusive to construct and prove. This,
indeed, marks the main difference between the proof techniques used here vs. that
used in our earlier work [8]: Lemma 2.6 relies on a coupling argument instead of the
convex analytic properties of the value function.
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2.5 The Case of p11 < p01
In the previous section we showed that a myopic policy is optimal if p11 ≥ p01.
In this section we examine what happens when p11 < p01, which corresponds to the
case when the Markovian channel state process exhibits a negative auto-correlation
over a unit time. This is perhaps a case of less practical interest and relevance.
However, as we shall see this case presents a greater degree of technical complexity
and richness than the previous case. Specifically, we first show that when the number
of channels is three (n = 3) or when the discount factor β ≤ 1
2
, the myopic policy
remains optimal even for the case of p11 < p01 (the proof for two channels in this
case was given earlier in [7]). We thus conclude that the myopic policy is optimal
for n ≤ 3 or β ≤ 1/2 regardless of the transition probabilities. We then present a
counter example showing that the the myopic policy is not optimal in general when
n ≥ 4 and β > 1/2. In particular, our counter example is for a finite horizon with
n = 4 and β = 1.
2.5.1 n = 3 or β ≤ 12
We start by developing some results parallel to those presented in the previous
section for the case of p11 ≥ p01.
Lemma 2.9. There exist T n-variable polynomial functions of order 1, denoted by
Zt(), t = 1, 2, · · · , T , i.e., each function is linear in all the elements, and can be
represented recursively in the following form:
Zt(ω̄) := ωn(1 + βZt+1(p11, τ(ωn−1), . . . , τ(ω1)))
+(1− ωn)βZt+1(τ(ωn−1), . . . , τ(ω1), p01).(2.23)
where ZT (ω̄) = ωn.
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Corollary 2. Zt(ω̄) given in (2.23) represents the expected total reward of the myopic
policy when ω̄ is ordered in increasing order of ωi.
Similar to Corollary 1, the above result follows directly from the policy description
given in Section 2.3.2.
It follows that the function Zt also has the same linearity property presented
earlier, i.e.
Zt(ω1, · · · , ωn−2, y, x)− Zt(ω1, · · · , ωn−2, x, y)
= (x− y)(Zt(ω1, · · · , ωn−2, 0, 1)− Zt(ω1, · · · , ωn−2, 1, 0)) .(2.24)
Similar results hold when we change the positions of x and y.
In the next lemma and theorem we prove that the myopic policy is still optimal
when p11 < p01 if n = 3 or β ≤ 1/2 . In particular, Lemma 2.10 below is the analogy
of Lemmas 2.7 and 2.8 combined.
Lemma 2.10. At time t (t = 1, 2, · · · , T ), for all j ≤ n − 2, we have the following
inequality for ∀1 ≥ x ≥ y ≥ 0 if either n = 3 or β ≤ 1/2:
Zt(ω1, . . . , ωj, y, x, ωj+3, . . . , ωn) ≥ Zt(ω1, . . . , ωj, x, y, ωj+3, . . . , ωn).(2.25)
Proof. We prove this by induction on t. The claim is obviously true for t = T .
Now suppose it’s true for t + 1, · · · , T − 1. Due to the linearity property of Zt,
Zt(ω1, . . . , ωj, y, x, ωj+3, . . . , ωn)− Zt(ω1, . . . , ωj, x, y, ωj+3, . . . , ωn)
= (x− y) (Zt(ω1, . . . , ωj, 0, 1, ωj+3, . . . , ωn)− Zt(ω1, . . . , ωj, 1, 0, ωj+3, . . . , ωn))
Thus it suffices to show that
Zt(ω1, . . . , ωj, 0, 1, ωj+3, . . . , ωn) ≥ Zt(ω1, . . . , ωj, 1, 0, ωj+3, . . . , ωn).
We treat the case when j < n− 2 and j = n− 2 separately. Indeed, without loss
of generality, let j = n − 3 (the proof follows exactly for all j ≤ n − 3 with more
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lengthy notations). At time t we have
Zt(ω1, . . . , ωn−3, 0, 1, ωn)− Zt(ω1, . . . , ωn−3, 1, 0, ωn)
= ωβ(Zt+1(p11, p11, p01, τ(ωn−3), . . . , τ(ω1))− Zt+1(p11, p01, p11, τ(ωn−3), . . . , τ(ω1)))
+ (1− ω)β(Zt+1(p11, p01, τ(ωn−3), . . . , τ(ω1), p01)− Zt+1(p01, p11, τ(ωn−3), . . . , τ(ω1), p01))
≥ 0
where the last inequality is due to the induction hypothesis.
Now we will consider the case when j = n− 2.
Zt(ω1, . . . , ωn−2, 0, 1)− Zt(ω1, . . . , ωn−2, 1, 0) = 1 + βZt+1(p11, p01, τ(ωn−2), . . . , τ(ω1))−
βZt+1(p11, τ(ωn−2), . . . , τ(ω1), p01).
Next we show that if β ≤ 1/2 or n = 3 the right hand side of above equation is
non-negative.
If β ≤ 1/2, then
1 + βZt+1(p11, p01, τ(ωn−2), . . . , τ(ω1))− βZt+1(p11, τ(ωn−2), . . . , τ(ω1), p01)
≥ 1− β
1− β ≥ 0.
If n = 3, then
1 + βZt+1(p11, p01, τ(ω1))− βZt+1(p11, τ(ω1), p01)
= 1 + β(τ(ω1)− p01)(Zt+1(p11, 0, 1)− Zt+1(p11, 1, 0))
≥ 1− β(Zt+1(p11, 0, 1)− Zt+1(p11, 1, 0))
≥ 0
where the first inequality is due to the fact that −1 ≤ τ(ω1) − p01 ≤ 0 and the last
inequality is given by the induction hypothesis.
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Theorem 2.11. Consider Problem (P1). Assume that p11 < p01. The myopic policy
is optimal for the case of n = 3 and the case of β ≤ 1/2 with arbitrary n. More
precisely, for these two cases, ∀t, 1 ≤ t ≤ T , we have
(2.26) Vt(ω̄; a = j)− Vt(ω̄; a = i) ≥ 0,
if ωj ≥ ωi for i = 1, · · · , n.
Proof. We prove by induction on t. The optimality of the myopic policy at time
t = T is obvious. Now assume that the myopic policy is optimal for all times
t+1, t+2, · · · , T−1, and we want to show that it is also optimal at time t. Suppose at
time t the channel probabilities are such that ωn ≥ ωi for i = 1, · · · , n−1. The myopic
policy is optimal at time t if and only if probing ωn followed by myopic probing is
better than probing any other channel followed by myopic probing. Mathematically,
this means
Zt(ω1, . . . , ωi−1, ωi+1, . . . , ωn, ωi) ≤ Zt(ω1, . . . , ωn), for all ω1 ≤ ωi ≤ ωn.
But this is a direct consequence of Lemma 2.10, completing the proof.
2.5.2 A 4-channel Counter Example
The following example shows that the myopic policy is not, in general, optimal
for n ≥ 4 when p11 < p01.
Example 2.1. Consider an example with the following parameters: p01 = 0.9, p11 =
0.1, β = 1, and ω̄ = [.97, .97, .98, .99]. Now compare the following two policies at
time T − 3: play myopically (I), or play the .98 channel first, followed by the myopic
policy (II). Computation reveals that
V IT−3(.97, .97, .98, .99) = 2.401863 < V
II
T−3(.97, .97, .98, .99) = 2.402968
which shows that the myopic policy is not optimal in this case.
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It remains an interesting question as to whether such counter examples exist in
the case when the initial condition is such that all channel are in the good state with
the stationary probability.
2.6 Infinite Horizon
Now we consider extensions of results in Sections 2.4 and 2.5 to (P2) and (P3),
i.e., to show that the myopic policy is also optimal for (P2) and (P3) under the same
conditions. Intuitively, this holds due to the fact that the stationary optimal policy
of the finite horizon problem is independent of the horizon as well as the discount
factor. Theorems 2.12 and 2.13 below concretely establish this.
We point out that the proofs of Theorems 2.12 and 2.13 do not rely on any
additional assumptions other than the optimality of the myopic policy for (P1).
Indeed, if the optimality of the myopic policy for (P1) can be established under
weaker conditions, Theorems 3 and 4 can be readily invoked to establish its optimality
under the same weaker condition for (P2) and (P3), respectively.
Theorem 2.12. If myopic policy is optimal for (P1), it is also optimal for (P2) for
0 ≤ β < 1. Furthermore, its value function is the limiting value function of (P1) as
the time horizon goes to infinity, i.e., we have maxπ J
π
β (ω̄) = limT→∞ maxπ J
π
T (ω̄).
Proof. We first use the bounded convergence theorem (BCT) to establish the fact that
under any deterministic stationary Markov policy π, we have Jπβ (ω̄) = limT→∞ J
π
T (ω̄).
We prove this by noting that















where the second equality is due to BCT for
∑T
t=1 β
t−1Rπ(t)(ω̄(t)) ≤ 11−β . This
proves the second part of the theorem by noting that due to the finiteness of the
action space, we can interchange maximization and limit.
Let π∗ denote the myopic policy. We now establish the optimality of π∗ for (P2).
From Theorem 1, we know:
Jπ
∗





T−1 (τ (ω̄, i|1)) β (1− ωi)Jπ
∗
T−1 (τ (ω̄, i|0))
}
.
Taking limit of both sides, we have
Jπ
∗





β (τ (ω̄, i|1)) + β (1− ωi)Jπ
∗
β (τ (ω̄, i|0))
}
.
Note that (2.27) is nothing but the dynamic programming equation for the infi-
nite horizon discounted reward problem given in (2.9). From the uniqueness of the
dynamic programming solution, then, we have
Jπ
∗
β (ω̄) = Vβ(ω̄) = max
π
Jπβ (ω̄)
hence, the optimality of the myopic policy.
Theorem 2.13. Consider (P3) with the expected average reward and under the er-
godicity assumption |p11 − p00| < 1. Myopic policy is optimal for problem (P3) if it
is optimal for (P1).
Proof. We consider the infinite horizon discounted cost for β < 1 under the optimal
policy denoted by π∗:
Jπ
∗





β (τ (ω̄, i|1)) + β(1− ωi)Jπ
∗
β (τ (ω̄, i|0))
}
.























Notice that the boundedness of the reward function and compactness of infor-
mation state implies that the sequence of {(1 − β)Jπ∗β (ω̄)} is bounded, i.e. for all
0 ≤ β ≤ 1,
(2.27) (1− β)Jπ∗β (ω̄) ≤ 1.
Also, applying Lemma 2 from [8] (which provides an upper bound on the difference in
value functions between taking two different actions followed by the optimal policy)








By Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem, (2.27) and (2.28) guarantee the existence of a
converging sequence βk → 1 such that
lim
k→∞














1−p11+p01 is the steady-state belief (the limiting belief when channel i is
not sensed for a long time).










































π∗ (τ (ω̄, i|1)) +
(1− ωi)hπ∗ (τ (ω̄, i|0))
}
.(2.31)
Note that (2.31) is nothing but the DP equation as given by (2.10). In addi-
tion, we know that the immediate reward as well as function h are both bounded
by max(1, K). This implies that J∗ is the maximum average reward, i.e. J∗ =
maxπ J
π
∞(ω̄(t)) (see [19, Theorems 6.1-6.3]).
On the other hand, we know from Theorem 2.12 that the myopic policy is optimal
for (P2) if it is for (P1), and thus we can take π∗ in (2.27) to be the myopic policy.




β (ω̄) = ωπ∗(ω̄) + βωπ∗(ω̄)J
π∗
β (τ (ω̄, π
∗(ω̄)|1)) + β(1− ωπ∗(ω̄))Jπ∗β (τ (ω̄, π∗(ω̄)|0)) .




(ω̄) = ωπ∗(ω̄) + ωπ∗(ω̄)h
π∗ (τ (ω̄, π∗(ω̄)|1)) + (1− ωπ∗(ω̄))hπ∗ (τ (ω̄, π∗(ω̄)|0)) ,
which shows that (J∗, hπ
∗
, π∗) is a canonical triplet [19, Theorems 6.2]. This, together
with boundedness of hπ
∗
and immediate reward, implies that the myopic policy π∗
is optimal for (P3) [19, Theorems 6.3].
2.7 Discussion and Related Work
The problem studied in this chapter may be viewed as a special case of a class
of MDPs known as the restless bandit problems [4]. In this class of problems, N
controlled Markov chains (also called projects or machines) are activated (or played)
one at a time. A machine when activated generates a state dependent reward and
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transits to the next state according to a Markov rule. A machine not activated
transits to the next state according to a (potentially different) Markov rule. The
problem is to decide the sequence in which these machines are activated so as to
maximize the expected (discounted or average) reward over an infinite horizon. To
put our problem in this context, each channel corresponds to a machine, and a
channel is activated when it is probed, and its information state goes through a
transition depending on the observation and the underlying channel model. When
a channel is not probed, its information state goes through a transition solely based
on the underlying channel model 5.
In the case that a machine stays frozen in its current state when not played,
the problem reduces to the multi-armed bandit problem, a class of problems solved
by Gittins in his 1970 seminal work [20]. Gittins showed that there exists an index
associated with each machine that is solely a function of that individual machine and
its state, and that playing the machine currently with the highest index is optimal.
This index has since been referred to as the Gittins index due to Whittle [21]. The
remarkable nature of this result lies in the fact that it essentially decomposes the
N -dimensional problem into N 1-dimensional problems, as an index is defined for
a machine independent of others. The basic model of multi-armed bandit has been
used previously in the context of channel access and cognitive radio networks. For
example, in [22], Bayesian learning was used to estimate the probability of a channel
being available, and the Gittins indices, calculated based on such estimates (which
were only updated when a channel is observed and used, thus giving rise to a multi-
armed bandit formulation rather than a restless bandit formulation), were used for
channel selection.
5The standard definition of bandit problems typically assumes finite or countably infinite state spaces. While our
problem can potentially have an uncountable state space, it is nevertheless countable for a given initial state. This
view has been taken throughout the chapter.
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On the other hand, relatively little is known about the structure of the optimal
policies for the restless bandit problems in general. It has been shown that the
Gittins index policy is not in general optimal in this case [4], and that this class
of problems is PSPACE-hard in general [23]. Whittle, in [4], proposed a Gittins-
like index (referred to as the Whittle’s index policy), shown to be optimal under a
constraint on the average number of machines that can be played at a given time,
and asymptotically optimal under certain limiting regimes [24]. There has been a
large volume of literature in this area, including various approximation algorithms,
see for example [25] and [26] for near-optimal heuristics, as well as conditions for
certain policies to be optimal for special cases of the restless bandit problem, see
e.g., [27, 28]. The nature of the results derived in the present chapter is similar to
that of [27, 28] in spirit. That is, we have shown that for this special case of the
restless bandit problem an index policy is optimal under certain conditions. For the
indexability (as defined by Whittle [4]) of this problem, see [29].
Recently Guha and Munagala [30, 31] studied a class of problems referred to as the
feedback multi-armed bandit problems. This class is very similar to the restless bandit
problem studied in the present chapter, with the difference that channels may have
different transition probabilities (thus this is a slight generalization to the one studied
here). While we identified conditions under which a simple greedy index policy is
optimal in the present chapter, Guha and Munagala in [30, 31] looked for provably
good approximation algorithms. In particular, they derived a 2 + ε-approximate
policy using a duality-based technique.
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2.8 Conclusion
The general problem of opportunistic sensing and access arises in many multi-
channel communication contexts. For cases where the stochastic evolution of chan-
nels can be modelled as i.i.d. two-state Markov chains, we showed that a simple and
robust myopic policy is optimal for the finite and infinite horizon discounted reward
criteria as well as the infinite horizon average reward criterion, when the state tran-
sitions are positively correlated over time. When the state transitions are negatively
correlated, we showed that the same policy is optimal when the number of channels
is limited to 2 or 3, and presented a counterexample for the case of 4 channels.
CHAPTER 3
Opportunistic Spectrum Access as a Restless Bandit
Problem With Multiple Plays
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter we study a multiple-play extension to the problem defined in the
previous chapter, where the user can select more than one channel at a time to sense
their availability and can use all available channels among those selected. More
specifically, we consider the following stochastic control problem: As before, there
are n uncontrolled Markov chains, each an independent, identically-distributed, two-
state discrete-time Markov process. The two states will be denoted as state 1 and
state 0 and the transition probabilities are given by pij, i, j = 0, 1. The system
evolves in discrete time. In each time instance, a user selects exactly k ≥ 1 out of
the n processes and is allowed to observe their states. For each selected process that
happens to be in state 1 the user gets a reward; there is no penalty for selecting
a channel that turns out to be state 0 but each such occurrence represents a lost
opportunity because the user is limited to selecting only k of them. The ones that
the user does not select do not reveal their true states. The objective is to derive a
selection strategy whose total expected discounted rewarded over a finite or infinite
horizon is maximized.
This is again a partially observed MDP (or POMDP) problem [3] due to the fact
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that the states of the underlying Markov processes are not fully observed at all times.
This problem is also an instance of the restless bandit problem with multiple plays
[4, 32, 33]. More discussion on this literature is provided in section 3.5. The problem
studied in the previous chapter is a special case of the present one when k = 1.
The application of the above problem abstraction to multichannel opportunistic
access is as follows. Each Markov process represents a wireless channel, whose state
transitions reflect dynamic changes in channel conditions caused by fading, interfer-
ence, and so on. Specifically, we will consider state 1 as the “good” state, in which
a user (or transmitter) can successfully communicate with a receiver; state 0 is the
“bad” state, in which communication will fail. The channel state is assumed to re-
main constant within a single discrete time step. A multichannel system consists of n
distinct channels. A user who wishes to use a particular channel at the beginning of
a time step must first sense or probe the state of the channel, and can only transmit
in a channel probed to be in the “good” state in the same time step. The user cannot
sense and access more than k channels at a time due to hardware limitations. If all
k selected channels turn out to be in the “bad” state, the user has to wait till the
beginning of the next time step to repeat the selection process.
This model captures some of the essential features of multichannel opportunistic
access as outlined above. On the other hand, it has the following limitations: the
simplicity of the iid two-state channel model; the implicit assumption that channel
sensing is perfect and the lack of penalty if the user transmits in a bad channel due
to imperfect sensing; and the assumption that the user can select an arbitrary set of
k channels out of n (e.g., it may only be able to access a contiguous block of channels
due to physical layer limitations). Nevertheless this model does allow us to obtain
analytical insights into the problem, and more importantly, some insight into the
39
more general problem of restless bandits with multiple plays.
As mentioned earlier, this model has been used and studied quite extensively
in the past few years, mostly within the context of opportunistic spectrum access
and cognitive radio networks, see for example [7, 34, 30, 31]. [7] studied the same
problem and proved the optimality of the greedy policy in the special case of k =
1, n = 2, [12] proved the optimality of the greedy policy in the case of k = n −
1, while [30, 31] looked for provably good approximation algorithms for a similar
problem. Furthermore, the indexability (in the context of Whittle’s heuristic index
and indexability definition [4]) of the underlying problem was studied in [29].
Our previous chapter (as well as [34]) established the optimality of the greedy
policy for the special case of k = 1 for arbitrary n and under the condition p11 ≥ p01,
i.e., when a channel’s state transitions are positively correlated. In this sense, the
results reported in the present chapter is a direct generalization of results in [34], as
we shall prove the optimality of the greedy policy under the same condition but for
any n ≥ k ≥ 1. The main thought process used to prove this more general result
derives from that used in [34]. However, there were considerable technical difficulties
we had to overcome to reach the conclusion.
In the remainder of this chapter we first formulate the problem in Section 3.2,
present preliminaries in Section 3.3, and then prove the optimality of the greedy
policy in Section 3.4. We discuss our work within the context of restless bandit
problems in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 concludes the chapter.
3.2 Problem Formulation
As outlined in the introduction, we consider a user trying to access the wireless
spectrum pre-divided into n independent and statistically identical channels, each
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given by a two-state Markov chain. The collection of n channels is denoted by N ,
each indexed by i = 1, 2, · · · , n.
The system operates in discrete time steps indexed by t, t = 1, 2, · · · , T , where T
is the time horizon of interest. At time t−, the channels go through state transitions,
and at time t the user makes the channel selection decision. Specifically, at time t
the user selects k of the n channels to sense, the set denoted by ak ⊂ N .
For channels sensed to be in the “good” state (state 1), the user transmits in those
channels and collects one unit of reward for each such channel. If none is sensed good,
the user does not transmit, collects no reward, and waits until t+1 to make another
choice. This process repeats sequentially until the time horizon expires.
The underlying system (i.e., the n channels) is not fully observable to the user.
Specifically, channels go through state transition at time t− (or anytime between
(t− 1, t)), thus when the user makes the channel sensing decision at time t, it does
not have the true state of any channel at time t. Furthermore, upon its action (at
time t+) only k channels reveal their true states. The user’s action space at time t
is given by the finite set ak(t) ⊂ N , where ak(t) = {i1, . . . , iK}.
We know (see e.g., [3, 16, 17]) that a sufficient statistic of such a system for
optimal decision making, or the information state of the system [16, 17], is given
by the conditional probabilities of the state each channel is in given all past actions
and observations. Since each channel can be in one of two states, we denote this
information state by ω̄(t) = [ω1(t), · · · , ωn(t)] ∈ [0, 1]n, where ωi(t) is the conditional
probability that channel i is in state 1 at time t given all past states, actions and
observations 1. Throughout the chapter ωi(t) will be referred to as the information
state of channel i at time t, or simply the channel probability of i at time t.
1Note that it is a standard way of turning a POMDP problem into a classic MDP problem by means of the
information state, the main implication being that the state space is now uncountable.
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Due to the Markovian nature of the channel model, the future information state
is only a function of the current information state and the current action; i.e., it is
independent of past history given the current information state and action. It follows
that the information state of the system evolves as follows. Given that the state at
time t is ω̄(t) and action ak(t) is taken, ωi(t+1) for i ∈ ak(t) can take on two values:
(1) p11 if the observation is that channel i is in a “good” state; this occurs with
probability ωi(t); (2) p01 if the observation is that channel i is in a “bad” state; this
occurs with probability 1 − ωi. For any other channel j 6∈ ak(t), with probability 1
the corresponding ωj(t+1) = τ(ωj(t)) where the operator τ : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is defined
as
(3.1) τ(ω) := ωp11 + (1− ω)p01, 0 ≤ ω ≤ 1 .
The objective is to maximize its total discounted expected reward over a finite










where 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 is the discount factor, and Rπt(ω̄(t)) is the reward collected under
state ω̄(t) when channels in the set ak(t) = πt(ω̄(t)) are selected.
The maximization in (P) is over the class of deterministic Markov policies 2. An
admissible policy π, given by the vector π = [π1, π2, · · · , πT ], is such that πt specifies
a mapping from the current information state ω̄(t) to a channel selection action
ak(t) = πt(ω̄(t)) ⊂ {1, 2, · · · , n}. This is done without loss of optimality due to the
Markovian nature of the underlying system, and due to known results on POMDPs
[17, Chapter 6].
2A Markov policy is a policy that derives its action only depending on the current (information) state, rather
than the entire history of states, see e.g., [17].
42
3.3 Preliminaries
The dynamic programming (DP) representation of problem (P) is given as follows:
















Vt+1(p01, . . . , p01, τ(ωj), p11, . . . , p11)),(3.2)
t = 1, 2, · · · , T − 1.
In the last term, the channel state probability vector consists of three parts: a
sequence of p01’s that represent those channels sensed to be in state 0 at time t and
the length of this sequence is the number of li’s equaling zero; a sequence of values
τ(ωj) for all j 6∈ ak; and a sequence of p11’s that represent those channels sensed to
be in state 1 at time t and the length of this sequence is the number of li’s equaling
one. Note that the future expected reward is calculated by summing over all possible
realizations of the k selected channels.
The value function Vt(ω̄) represents the maximum expected future reward that
can be accrued starting from time t when the information state is ω̄. In particular,
we have V1(ω̄) = maxπ J
π
T (ω̄), and an optimal deterministic Markov policy exists
such that a = π∗t (ω̄) achieves the maximum in (3.3) (see e.g., [18] (Chapter 4)).
For simplicity of representation, we introduce the following notations:
• p01[x]: this is the vector [p01, p01, · · · , p01] of length x;
• p11[x]: this is the vector [p11, p11, · · · , p11] of length x.
• We will use the notation:







for l1, · · · , lk ∈ {0, 1}. That is, given a vector of 0s and 1s (total of k elements),
q() is the probability that a set of k channels are in states given by the vector.






ωi + β ·
∑
li∈{0,1},i∈ak
q(l1, · · · , lk) · Vt+1(p01[k −
∑
li], · · · , τ(ωj), p11[
∑
li]) .
Solving (P) using the above recursive equation can be computationally heavy,
especially considering the fact that ω̄ is a vector of probabilities. It is thus common
to consider suboptimal policies that are easier to compute and implement. One of
the simplest such heuristics is a greedy policy where at each time step we take an
action that maximizes the immediate one-step reward. Our focus is to examine the
optimality properties of such a simple greedy policy.
For problem (P), the greedy policy under state ω̄ = [ω1, ω2, · · · , ωn] is given by





That is, the greedy policy seeks to maximize the reward as if there were only one
step remaining in the horizon. In the next section we investigate the optimality of
this policy. Specifically, we will show that it is optimal in the case of p11 ≥ p01. This
extends the earlier result in [34] that showed this to be true for the special case of
k = 1.
3.4 Optimality of the Greedy Policy
In this section we show that the greedy policy is optimal when p11 ≥ p01. The
main theorem of this section is as follows.
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Theorem 3.1. The greedy policy is optimal for Problem (P) under the assumption
that p11 ≥ p01. That is, for t = 1, 2, · · · , T , k ≤ n, and ∀ω̄ = [ω1, · · · , ωn] ∈ [0, 1]n,
we have
V kt (ω̄; z
k(ω̄)) ≥ V kt (ω̄; ak), ∀ak ⊂ N ,(3.4)
where zk(ω̄) is the subset whose elements (indices) correspond to the k largest values
in ω̄, and V kt (ω̄; a
k) the expected value of action ak followed by behaving optimally.
Below we present a number of lemmas used in the proof of this theorem. The first
lemma introduces a notation that allows us to express the expected future reward
under the greedy policy.
Lemma 3.2. There exist T n-variable functions, denoted by W kt (ω̄), t = 1, 2, · · · , T ,
each of which is a polynomial of order 13 and can be represented recursively in the
following form:




W kt (ω̄) =
∑
n−1+1≤i≤n
ωi + β ·
∑
ln,ln−1,··· ,ln+k−1∈{0,1}
q(ln, · · · , ln+k−1) ·
W kt+1(p01[k −
∑
li], τ(ωi), · · · , τ(ωn−k), p11[
∑
li]) .
The proof is easily obtained using backward induction on t given the recursive
equation and noting that the mapping τ() is linear. The detailed proof is thus
omitted for brevity.
A few remarks are in order on this function W kt (ω̄).
1. Firstly, when ω̄ is given by an ordered vector [ω1, ω2, · · · , ωn] with ω1 ≤ ω2 ≤
· · · ≤ ωn, W kt (ω̄) is the expected total discounted future reward (from t to T )
by following the greedy policy.
3Each function Wt is affine in each variable, when all other variables are held constant.
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This follows from how the greedy policy works in the special case of p11 ≥ p01.
Note that in this case the conditional probability updating function τ(ω) is a
monotonically increasing function, i.e., τ(ω1) ≥ τ(ω2) for ω1 ≥ ω2. Therefore
the ordering of channel probabilities is preserved among those that are not
observed.
If a channel has been observed to be in state “1” (respectively “0”), its prob-
ability at the next step becomes p11 ≥ τ(ω) (respectively p01 ≤ τ(ω)) for any
ω ∈ [0, 1]. In other words, a channel observed to be in state “1” (respectively
“0”) will have the highest (respectively lowest) possible probability among all
channels.
Therefore if we take the initial information state ω̄(1), order the channels ac-
cording to their probabilities ωi(1), and sense the highest k channels (top k of
the ordered list) with ties broken randomly, then following the greedy policy
means that in subsequent steps we will keep a channel in its current position if
it was sensed to be in state 1 in the previous slot; otherwise, it was observed to
be in state 0 and gets thrown to the bottom of the ordered list. The policy then
selects the next top most (or rightmost) k channels on this new ordered list.
This procedure is essentially the same as that given in the recursive expression
of W ().
2. Secondly, when ω̄ is not ordered, W kt () reflects a policy that simply goes down
the list of channels by the order fixed in ω̄, while each time tossing the ones
observed to be 0 to the end of the list and keeing those observed to be 1 at the
top of the list.
3. Thirdly, the fact that WKt is a polynomial of order 1 and affine in each of its
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elements implies that
WKt (ω1, · · · , ωn−2, y, x)−WKt (ω1, · · · , ωn−2, x, y)
= (x− y)[WKt (ω1, · · · , ωn−2, 0, 1)− WKt (ω1, · · · , ωn−2, 1, 0)] .
Similar results hold when we change the positions of x and y. To see this,
consider the above as two functions of x and y, each having an x term, a y term,
an xy term and a constant term. Since we are only swapping the positions of x
and y in these two functions, the constant term remains the same, and so does
the xy term. Thus the only difference is the x term and the y term, as given in
the above equation. This linearity result is used later in our proof.
The next lemma establishes a sufficient condition for the optimality of the greedy
policy.
Lemma 3.3. Consider Problem (P) under the assumption that p11 ≥ p01. To show
that the greedy policy is optimal at time t given that it is optimal at t+1, t+2, · · · , T ,
it suffices to show that at time t we have
W kt (ω1, · · · , ωj, x, y, · · · , ωn) ≤ W kt (ω1, · · · , ωj, y, x, · · · , ωn),(3.5)
for all x ≥ y and all 0 ≤ j ≤ n − 2, with j = 0 implying W kt (x, y, ω3, · · · , ωn) ≤
W kt (y, x, ω3, · · · , ωn).
Proof. Since the greedy policy is optimal from t + 1 on, it is sufficient to show that
selecting the best k channels followed by the greedy policy is better than selecting
any other set of k channels followed by the greedy policy. If channels are ordered
ω1 ≤ · · · ≤ ωi ≤ · · · ≤ ωn then the reward of the former is precisely given by
WKt (ω1, . . . , ωn). On the other hand, the reward of selecting an arbitrary set a
k of k
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channels followed by acting greedily can be expressed as W kt (a
k, ak), where ak is the
(increasingly) ordered set of channels not included in ak. It remains to show that if
Eqn (3.5) is true then we have W kt (a
k, ak) ≤ WKt (ω1, . . . , ωn). This is easily done
since the ordered list (ak, ak) may be converted to ω1, . . . , ωn through a sequence
of switchings between two neighboring elements that are not increasingly ordered.
Each such switch invokes (3.5), thereby maintaining the “≤” relationship.
Lemma 3.4. For 0 ≤ ω1 ≤ ω2 ≤ . . . ≤ ωn ≤ 1, we have the following two inequalities
for all t = 1, 2, · · · , T :
(A) : 1 + W kt (ω2, · · · , ωn, ω1) ≥ W kt (ω1, · · · , ωn)
(B) : W kt (ω1, · · · , ωj, y, x, ωj+3, · · · , ωn) ≥
W kt (ω1, · · · , x, y, ωj+3, · · · , ωn),
where x ≥ y, 0 ≤ j ≤ n−2, and j = 0 implies W kt (y, x, ω3, · · · , ωn) ≥ W kt (x, y, ω3, · · · , ωn).
This lemma is the key to our main result and its proof, which uses a sample path
argument, highly instructive. It is however also lengthy, and for this reason has been
relegated to the Appendix.
With the above lemmas, Theorem 1 is easily proven:
Proof of Theorem 1: We prove by induction on T . When t = T , the greedy policy
is obviously optimal. Suppose it is also optimal for all times t + 1, t + 2, · · · , T ,
under the assumption p11 ≥ p01. Then at time t, by Lemma 3.3, it suffices to show
that W kt (ω1, · · · , ωj, x, y, · · · , ωn) ≤ W kt (ω1, · · · , ωj, y, x, · · · , ωn) for all x ≥ y and
0 ≤ j ≤ n− 2. But this is proven in Lemma 3.4.
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3.5 Discussion
While the formulation (P) is a finite horizon problem, the same result applies to
the infinite horizon discounted reward case using standard techniques as we have
done in our previous work [8, 34].
In the case of infinite horizon, the problem studied in this chapter is closely
associated with the class of multi-armed bandit problems [20] and restless bandit
problems [4]. This is a class of problems where n controlled Markov chains (also
called machines or arms) are activated (or played) one at a time. A machine when
activated generates a state dependent reward and moves to the next state according
to a Markov rule. A machine not activated either stays frozen in its current state (a
rested bandit) or moves to the next state according to a possibly different Markov rule
(a restless bandit). The problem is to decide the sequence in which these machines
are activated so as to maximize the expected (discounted or average) reward over an
infinite horizon.
The multi-armed bandit problem was originally solved by Gittins (see [20]), who
showed that there exists an index associated with each machine that is solely a
function of that individual machine and its state, and that playing the machine
currently with the highest index is optimal. This index has since been referred to
as the Gittins index. The remarkable nature of this result lies in the fact that it
decomposes the n-dimensional problem into n 1-dimensional problems, as an index
is defined for a machine independent of others. The restless bandit problem on the
other hand was proven much more complex, and is PSPACE-hard in general [23].
Relatively little is known about the structure of its optimal policy in general. In
particular, the Gittins index policy is not in general optimal [4].
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When multiple machines are activated simultaneously, the resulting problem is
referred to as multi-armed bandits with multiple plays. Again optimal solutions to
this class of problems are not known in general. A natural extension to the Gittins
index policy in this case is to play the machines with the highest Gittins indices
(this will be referred to as the extended Gittins index policy below). This is not in
general optimal for multi-armed bandits with multiple plays and an infinite horizon
discounted reward criterion, see e.g., [35, 36]. However, it may be optimal in some
cases, see e.g., [36] for conditions on the reward function, and [37] for an undiscounted
case where the Gittins index is always achieved at time 1. Even less is known when
the bandits are restless, though asymptotic results for restless bandits with multiple
plays were provided in [4] and [24].
The problem studied in the present chapter is an instance of the restless bandits
with multiple plays (in the infinite horizon case). Therefore what we have shown in
this chapter is an instance of the restless bandits problem with multiple plays, for
which the extended Gittins index policy is optimal.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we studied a stochastic control problem that arose in opportunistic
spectrum access. A user can sense and access k out of n channels at a time and must
select judiciously in order to maximize its reward. We extend a previous result
where a greedy policy was shown to be optimal in the special case of k = 1 under the
condition that the channel state transitions are positively correlated over time. In
this chapter we showed that under the same condition the greedy policy is optimal
for the general case of k ≥ 1. This result also contributes to the understanding of
the class of restless bandit problems with multiple plays.
CHAPTER 4
Opportunistic Spectrum Sharing as a Congestion Game
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter we present a generalized form of the class of non-coopertive strate-
gic games known as congestion games (CG) [38, 39], and study its properties as well
as its application to spectrum sharing in a cognitive radio network.
In a classical congestion game, multiple users share multiple resources. The payoff
1 for any user to use a particular resource depends on the number of users using that
resource concurrently. A detailed and formal description is provided in Section 4.2.
The congestion game framework is well suited to model resource competition where
the resulting payoff is a function of the level of congestion (number of active users).
It has been extensively studied within the context of network routing, see for instance
the congestion game studied in [40] 2, where source nodes seek minimum delay path
to a destination and the delay of a link depends on the number of flows going through
that link.
A congestion game enjoys many nice properties. For example, it always has a
pure strategy Nash Equilibrium (NE), and any asynchronous improvement path is
1Sometimes people consider the cost of using a resource instead of the payoff. If we define the cost as the inverse
of the payoff, then maximizing the payoff is equivalent to minimizing the cost. For simplicity of presentation, we will
focus on the maximization of payoff in this chapter.
2Note that while also called “network congestion game”, the game studied in [40] is essentially a classical congestion
game with resources being links in a network. By contrast, the network congestion game defined in this chapter is a
network game meaning that the relationship among players are given by a network.
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finite and will lead to a pure strategy NE (referred to as the finite improvement
property (FIP). In fact, while the system is decentralized and all players are selfish,
by seeking to optimize their individual objectives they end up optimizing a global
objective, also called the potential function, and doing so in a finite number of steps
regardless of the updating sequence.
For these reasons, it is tempting to model resource competition in a wireless com-
munication system as a congestion game. However, the standard congestion game
fails to capture a critical aspect of resource sharing in wireless communication: in-
terference. A key assumption underlying the congestion game model is that all users
have an equal impact on the congestion, and therefore all that matters is the total
number of users of a resource. This however is not true in wireless communication.
Specifically, if we consider bandwidth or channels as resources, then sharing the
same channel is complicated by interference; a user’s payoff (e.g., channel quality,
achievable rates, etc.) depends on who the other users are and how much interfer-
ence it receives from them. If all other simultaneous users are located sufficiently far
away, then sharing may not cause any performance degradation, a feature commonly
known as spatial reuse.
The above consideration poses significant challenge in using the congestion game
model depending on what type of user objectives we are interested in. In our recent
work [41], we addressed the user-specific interference issue within the congestion
game framework, by introducing a concept called resource expansion, where we define
virtual resources as certain spectral-spatial unit that allows us to capture pair-wise
interference. This approach was shown to be quite effective for user objectives like
interference minimization.
In this chapter, we take a different approach where we generalize the standard
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congestion games to directly account for the interference relationship and spatial
reuse in wireless networks. Specifically, under this generalization, users are placed
over a network representing an interference graph. An edge exists between two users
that interfere with each other. In using a resource (a wireless channel), a user’s payoff
is a function of the total number of users within its interference neighborhood using
it. Therefore, resources are reusable beyond a user’s interference set. This extension
is a generalization of the original congestion game definition, as the former reduces to
the latter if the underlying network is complete (i.e., every user interferes with every
other user). This class of generalized games will be referred to as network congestion
games (NCG).
The applicability of this class of games to a multi-channel, multi-user wireless
communication system can be easily understood. Specifically, we consider such a
system where a user can only access one channel at a time, but can switch between
channels. A user’s principal interest lies in optimizing its own performance objective
(i.e., its data rate) by selecting the best channel for itself. This and similar problems
have recently captured increasing interest from the research community, particularly
in the context of cognitive radio networks (CRN) and software defined ratio (SDR)
technologies, whereby devices are expected to have far greater flexibility in sensing
channel availability/condition and moving operating frequencies.
While directly motivated by resource sharing in a multi-channel, multi-user wire-
less communication system, the definition of a NCG is potentially more broadly
applicable. It simply reflects the notion that in some application scenarios resources
may be shared without conflict of interest. In subsequent sections we will examine
what properties this class of games possesses. Our main findings are summarized as
follows for undirected network graphs and non-increasing payoff functions:
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1. The FIP property is preserved in an NCG with only two resources/channels.
Counter examples exist for three or more resources.
2. A pure strategy NE exists in a NCG over a tree network and a loop.
3. A pure strategy NE exists when there is either a dominating resource (a channel
with much larger bandwidth than the rest) or when all resources are identical
(all channels are equal). Furthermore, in the latter case the FIP also exists.
In addition, we also show that an NE does not in general exist if the network graph
is directed (meaning that the interference relationship between users is asymmetric),
or that the user payoff functions are non-monotonic.
It has to be mentioned that game theoretic approaches have often been used to
devise effective decentralized solutions to a multi-agent system. Within the context
of wireless communication networks and interference modeling, different classes of
games have been studied. An example is the well-known Gaussian interference game
[42, 43]. In a Gaussian interference game, a player can spread a fixed amount of
power arbitrarily across a continuous bandwidth, and tries to maximize its total rate
in a Gaussian interference channel over all possible power allocation strategies. It has
been shown [42] that it has a pure strategy NE, but the NE can be quite inefficient;
playing a repeated game can improve the performance. In addition, previous work
[44] investigated a market based power control mechanism via supermodularity, while
previous work [45] studied the Bayesian form of the Gaussian interference game in
the case of incomplete information. By contrast, in our problem the total power of
a user is not divisible, and it can only use it in one channel at a time. This setup
is more appropriate for scenarios where the channels have been pre-defined, and the
users do not have the ability to access multiple channels simultaneously (which is
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the case with many existing devices).
The organization of the remainder of this chapter is as follows. In Section 4.2 we
present a brief review on the literature of congestion games, and formally define the
class of network congestion games in Section 4.3. We then derive conditions under
which this class of games possesses the finite improvement property (Section 4.4).
We further show a series of conditions, on the underlying network graph in Section
4.5 and on the user payoff function in Section 4.6, under which these games have a
pure strategy NE. We discuss extensions to our work and conclude the chapter in
4.7.
4.2 A Review of Congestion Games
In this section we provide a brief review on the definition of congestion games and
their known properties3. We then discuss why the standard congestion game does
not take into account spatial reuse and motivate our generalized network congestion
games.
4.2.1 Congestion Games
Congestion games [38, 39] are a class of strategic games given by the tuple
(I,R, (Σi)i∈I , (gr)r∈R), where I = {1, 2, · · · , N} denotes a set of users,R = {1, 2, · · · , R}
a set of resources, Σi ⊂ 2R the strategy space of player i, and gr : N→ Z a payoff (or
cost) function associated with resource r. The payoff (cost) gr is a function of the
total number of users using resource r and in general assumed to be non-increasing
(non-decreasing). A player in this game aims to maximize (minimize) its total payoff
(cost) which is the sum total of payoff (cost) over all resources its strategy involves.
If we denote by σ = (σ1, σ2, · · · , σN) the strategy profile, where σi ∈ Σi, then
3This review along with some of our notations are primarily based on references [38, 39, 46].
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where nr(σ) is the total number of users using resource r under the strategy profile
σ, with and r ∈ σi denoting that user i selects resource r under σ.














where the second equality comes from exchanging the two sums and mir(σ) denotes
the number of players who use resource r under strategy σ and whose corresponding
indices do not exceed i (i.e., in the set {1, 2, · · · , i}).
Next we show that the change in a user’s payoff as a results off its unilateral move
(i.e., all other users stay put) is exactly the same as the change in the potential, which
may be viewed as a global objective function. Consider player i, who unilaterally
moves from strategy σi (within the profile σ) to strategy σ
′
i (within the profile σ
′
).
The potential changes by


















i)− gi(σ−i, σi) ,(4.3)
where the second equality comes from the fact that for resources that are used by
both strategies σi and σ
′
i there is no change in their total number of users. To see why
the first equality is true, set i = N , in which case this equality is a direct consequence
of the change of sums equation (4.2). To see why this is true for any 1 ≤ i ≤ N ,
simply note that the ordering of users is arbitrary so any user making a change may
be viewed as the Nth user.
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Consider now a sequence of strategy changes made by users asynchronously in
which each change improves the user’s payoff (this is referred to as a sequence of im-
provement steps). The above result shows that upon each such change the potential
also improves. Since the potential of any strategy profile is finite, it follows that every
sequence of improvement steps is finite, and they converge to a pure strategy Nash
Equilibrium. This is known as the finite improvement property (FIP). Furthermore,
this NE is a local optimal point of the potential function φ, defined as a strategy
profile where changing one coordinate cannot result in a greater value of φ.
It is not difficult to see why the standard definition of a congestion game does
not capture the features of wireless communication. In particular, if we consider
channels as resources, then the payoff gr(n) for using channel r when there are n
simultaneous users does not reflect reality: the function gr(·) in general takes a user-
specific argument since different users experience different levels of interference even
when using the same resource. This user specificity is also different from that studied
in [2], where gr(·) is a user-specific function gir(·) but it takes the non-user specific
argument n. To analyze and understand the consequence of this difference, we would
need to extend and generalize the definition of the standard congestion game.
For the rest of this chapter, the term player or user specifically refers to a pair
of transmitter and receiver in the network. Interference in this context is between
one user’s transmitter and another user’s receiver. This is commonly done in the




In this section we formally definite our generalized congestion game, the network
congestion games (NCG). Specifically, a NCG is given by (I,R, (Σi)i∈I , {Ki}i∈I , {gir}r∈R,i∈I),
where Ki is the interference set of user i, excluding itself, while all other elements
maintain the same meaning as in a standard CG. The payoff user i receives for using
resource r is given by gir(n
i
r(σ) + 1) where n
i
r(σ) = |{j : r ∈ σj, j ∈ Ki}|. That
is, user i’s payoff for using r is a (user-specific) function of the number of users in-
terfering with itself, plus itself. Here we have explicitly made the payoff functions
user-specific, as evidenced by the index i in gir(·). This is done in an attempt to
capture the fact that users with different coding/modulation schemes may obtain
different rates from using the same channel.
A user’s payoff is the sum of payoffs from all the resources it uses. Note that if a
user is allowed to simultaneously use all available resources, then its best strategy is
to simply use all of them regardless of other users, provided that gir is a non-negative
function. If all users are allowed such a strategy, then the existence of an NE is
trivially true.
In this chapter, we will limit our attention to the case where each user is allowed
only one channel at a time, i.e., its strategy space Σi ∈ R consists of R single channel
strategies. In this case the payoff user i receives for using a single channel r is given
by gir(n
i
r + 1) where n
i
r(σ) = |{j : r = σj, j ∈ Ki}|. Our goal is to identify key
properties of this game.
It’s worth noting that due to this generalization, Rosenthal’s definition of a poten-
tial function as given in the previous section no longer applies. To slightly simplify
this problem, we make the extra assumption that i ∈ Kj if and only if j ∈ Ki. This
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has the intuitive meaning that if node i interferes with node j, the reverse is also
true. This symmetry does not always hold in reality, but is nonetheless a useful
one to help us obtain meaningful insight. It is easy to see that we can equivalently
represent a more general problem on the following directed graph, where a node
represents a user and a directed edge connects node i to node j if and only if i ∈ Kj.
The network congestion game can now be stated as a coloring problem, where each
node picks a color and receives a value depending on the conflict (number of same
colors neighboring to a node); the goal is to see whether an NE exists and whether
a decentralized selfish scheme leads to an NE. For the special case that we consider
in this chapter, the graph is undirected, where there is an undirected edge between
nodes i and j if and only if i ∈ Kj and j ∈ Ki.
For simplicity of exposition, in subsequent sections we will often present the prob-
lem in its coloring version, and will use the terms resource, channel, and color inter-
changeably.
4.4 Existence of the Finite Improvement Property
In this section we investigate whether the network congestion game as defined
in the previous section possesses the FIP property. Once a game has the FIP, it
immediately follows that it has an NE as we described in Section 4.2. Below we show
that in the case of two resources (colors) this game indeed has the FIP property, and
as a result an NE exists. We also show through a counter example that for the case
of 3 or more colors the FIP property does not hold. This also implies that in such
cases an exact potential function does not exist for this game, as the FIP is a direct
consequence of the existence of a potential function.
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4.4.1 The Finite Improvement Property for 2 resources
We shall establish this result by a contradiction argument. Suppose that we have
a sequence of asynchronous4 updates that starts and ends in the exact same color
assignment (or state) for all users. We denote such a sequence by
U = {u(1), u(2), · · ·u(T )},(4.4)
where u(t) ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} denotes the user making the change at time t, and T is
the length of this sequence. The starting state (or the color choice) of the system is
given by
S(1) = {s1(1), s2(1), · · · , sN(1)},(4.5)
where si(1) ∈ {r, b}, i.e., the state of each user is either “r” for Red, or “b” for Blue.
A user’s state of color is defined for time t−, i.e., right before a color change is made
by some user at time t. In other words, si(t) denotes the color of user i at time t
−.
Since there are only two colors, we use the notation s̄ to denote the opposite color
of a color s. The states after the last round of change at time T is denoted by S(T ).
Since this sequence of updates form a loop, i.e., S(1−) = S(T ), we can naturally
view these updates as being placed around a circle, starting at time 1− and ending
at T , when the system returns to its original state. This is shown in Figure 4.1. Note
that traversing the circle starting from any point results in an improvement path;
hence the notion of a starting point becomes inconsequential.
Since this sequence of updates is an improvement path, each change must increase
the payoff of the user making the change 5. For example, suppose user i changes from
4We will remove the word asynchronous in the following with the understanding that whenever we refer to
updates they are assumed to be asynchronous updates, i.e., there will not be two or more users changing their
strategies simultaneously at any time.
5Here we assume that a user only makes a change if there is strict increase in its payoff.
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red to blue at time t, and i has x red neighbors and y blue neighbors at t6. Then we
must have:
gib(y + 1) > g
i
r(x + 1) .(4.6)
Similarly, we can obtain one inequality for each of the T changes. Our goal is to show
that these T inequalities cannot be consistent with each other. The challenge here
is that this contradiction has to hold for arbitrary non-increasing functions {gir, gib}.
The way we address this challenge is to show that the above inequality leads to
another inequality that does not involve the payoff functions when we consider pairs
of reverse changes by the same user. This is shown in Lemma 4.2.
Definition 4.1 (Reverse-change pairs).
Consider an arbitrary user i’s two reverse strategy/color changes in an improvement
path, one from s to s̄ at time t and the other from s̄ to s at time t′. Let SS it,t′ denote
the set of i’s neighbors (not including i) who have the same color as i at both times
of change (i.e., at t− and t′−, respectively). Let OOit,t′ denote the set of i’s neighbors
(not including i) who have the opposite color as i at both times of change. Similarly,
we will denote by SOit,t′ (respectively OS it,t′) the number of i’s neighbors whose color
is the same as (opposite of, respectively) i’s at the first update and the opposite of
(same as, respectively ) i’s at the second update.
Lemma 4.2. (Reverse-change inequality) Consider the network congestion game
defined in the previous section with non-increasing payoff functions and two re-
sources/colors. Suppose an arbitrary user i makes two reverse strategy/color changes
in an improvement path, one from s to s̄ at time t and the other from s̄ to s at time
















Figure 4.1: Representing an improvement loop on a circle: times of updates t and the updating user
(u(t)) are illustrated along with their color right before a change. An arrow connects a
single user’s two consecutive color changes.
t′. Then we have
|SS it,t′| > |OOit,t′|, ∀i ∈ I .(4.7)
That is, among i’s neighbors, there are strictly more users that have the same color
as i at both times of change than those with the opposite color as i at both times of
change.
Proof. Since this is an improvement path, whenever i makes a change it is for higher
payoff. Thus we must have at the time of its first change and its second change,
respectively, the following inequalities:
gis̄(|OS it,t′|+ |OOit,t′|+ 1) > gis(|SOit,t′|+ |SS it,t′|+ 1) ;(4.8)
gis(|SOit,t′|+ |OOit,t′|+ 1) > gis̄(|OS it,t′|+ |SS it,t′|+ 1) .(4.9)
We now prove the lemma by contradiction. Suppose that the statement is not true
and that we have |SS it,t′| ≤ |OOit,t′|. Then due to the non-increasing assumption on
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the payoff functions we have
gis̄(|OS it,t′|+ |SS it,t′|+ 1) ≥ gis̄(|OS it,t′ |+ |OOit,t′|+ 1) > gis(|SOit,t′ |+ |SS it,t′ |+ 1)
(4.10)
≥ gis(|SOit,t′ |+ |OOit,t′|+ 1)(4.11)
where the second inequality is due to (4.8). However, this contradicts with (4.9),
completing the proof.
We point out that by the above lemma the payoff comparison is reduced to count-
ing different sets of users. This greatly simplifies the process of proving the main
theorem of this section. Below we show that it is impossible to have a finite sequence
of asynchronous improvement steps ending in the same color state as it started with.
At the heart of the proof is the repeated use of the above lemma to show that loops
cannot form in a sequence of asynchronous updates.
Theorem 4.3. Consider the network congestion game defined in the previous section
with non-increasing payoff functions. For the special case when there are only two
resources/colors to choose from and a user can only use one at a time, we have the
finite improvement property.
Proof. We prove this by contradiction. As illustrated by Figure 4.1, we consider a
sequence of improvement updates that results in the same state.
Consider every two successive color changes, along this circle clockwise starting
from time t = 1, that a user u(t) makes at time t and t′ from color s = su(t)(t) to
s̄, and then back to s, respectively. Note that this will include the two “successive”
changes formed by a user’s last change and its first change (successive on this circle
but not in terms of time). We have illustrated this in Figure 4.1 by connecting a pair
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of successive color changes using an arrow. It is easy to see that there are altogether
T such pairs (or arrows).
For each arrow in Figure 4.1, or equivalently each pair of successive color changes
by the same user, we consider the two sets SSu(t)t,t′ and OOu(t)t,t′ in Definition 4.1. Due
to the user association, we will also refer to these sets as perceived by user u(t). By
Lemma 1, given an updating sequence with the same starting and ending states, we
have for each pair of successive reverse changes by the same user, at time t and time
t′, respectively:
|SSu(t)t,t′ | > |OOu(t)t,t′ |, t = 1, 2, · · · , T .(4.12)
That is, the SS sets are strictly larger than the OO sets.
This gives us a total of T inequalities, one for each update in the sequence and
each containing two sets. Equivalently there is one inequality per arrow illustrated
in Figure 4.1. We next consider how many users are in each of these 2T sets (note
that by keeping the same “>” relationship, the SS sets are always on the LHS of
these inequalities and the OO sets are always on the RHS). To do this, we will
examine users by pairs – we will take a pair of users and see how many times they
appear in each other’s sets in these inequalities. In Claim 1 below, we show that
they collectively appear the same number of times in the LHS sets and in the RHS
sets. We then enumerate all user pairs. What this result says is that these users
collectively contribute to an equal number of times to the LHS and RHS of the set
of inequalities given in Eqn. (4.12). Adding up all these inequalities, this translates
to the fact that the total size of the sets on the LHS and those on the RHS must be
equal. This however contradicts the strict inequality, thus completing the proof.
Claim 1. Consider a pair of users A and B in an improvement updating loop, and
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consider how they are perceived in each other’s set. Then A and B collectively appear
the same number of times in the LHS sets (the SS sets) and in the RHS sets (the
OO sets).
Proof. First note that A and B have to be in each other’s interference set for them
to appear in each other’s SS and OO sets. Since we are only looking at two users
and how they appear in each other’s sets, without loss of generality we can limit our
attention to a subsequence of the original updating sequence involving only A and
B, given by
UAB = {u(t1), u(t2), · · · , u(tl)}(4.13)
where u(tj) ∈ {A,B}, tj ∈ {1, 2, · · · , T}, and l is the length of this subsequence, i.e.,
the total number of updates between A and B. As before, this subsequence can also
be represented clockwise along a circle.
It helps to consider an example of such a sequence, say, ABAABBABAA, also
shown in Figure 4.2. In what follows we will express an odd train as the odd number
of consecutive changes of one user sandwiched between the other user’s changes, e.g.,
the odd train ABA in the above subsequence. To avoid ambiguity, we will further
write this sequence as A1B2A3A4B5B6A7B8A9A10.
A few things to note about such a sequence:
1. Since the starting and ending states are the same, each user must appear an
even number of times in the sequence. Since each user appears an even number
of times, there must be an even number of odd trains along the circle for any
user.
2. A user (say A) only appears in the other’s (say B’s) SS or OO sets if it has
an odd train between the other user’s two successive appearances. This means
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that there is an even number of relevant inequalities where A appears in B’s
inequalities (either on the LHS or the RHS), and vice versa.
3. Consider the collection of all relevant inequalities discussed above, one for each
odd train, in the order of their appearance on the circle (all four such inequal-
ities are illustrated in Figure 4.2). Then A and B contribute to each other’s
inequalities on alternating sides along this updating sequence/circle. That is,
suppose the first inequality is A’s and B goes into its LHS, then in the next in-
equality (could be either A’s or B’s) the contribution (either A to B’s inequality
or B to A’s inequality) is on the RHS. Take our running example, for instance,
the first inequality is due to the odd train marked by the sequence A1B2A3, and
the second B6A7B8. Suppose A and B start with different colors, then in the
first inequality, B appears in the RHS; in the second, A appears in the LHS.
We now explain why the third point above is true. The reason is because for one
user (B) to appear in the other’s (A’s) LHS, they must start by having the same
color and again have the same color right before A’s second change (see e.g. the
subsequence A1B2A3 in the running example). Until the next odd train (B6A7B8),
both will make an even number of changes including A’s second change (A3A4B5B6).
The next inequality belongs to the user who makes the last change before the next
odd train (B) . As perceived by this user (B) right before this change, the two
must now have different colors. This is because as just stated A will have made an
even number of changes from the last time they are of the same color (by the end of
A1B2), while B is exactly one change away from an even number of changes (by the
end of A1B2A3A4B5). Therefore, the contribution from the other user (A) to this
inequality must be to the RHS.
To summarize, one can see that essentially the color relationship between A and
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B reverses upon each update, and there is an odd number of updates between the
starting points of two consecutive odd trains (e.g., 5 updates between A1 and B6,
or 1 update between B6 and A7) so the color relationship flips for each inequality in
sequence.
The above argument establishes that as we go down the list of inequalities and
count the size of the sets on the LHS vs. that on the RHS, we alternate between
the two sides. Since there are exactly even number of such inequalities, we have
established that A and B collectively appear the same number of times in the LHS



























Figure 4.2: Example of an updating sequence “A1B2A3A4B5B6A7B8A9A10” illustrated on a circle.
The color coding denotes the color of a user right before the indicated change. Each
arrow connecting two successive changes by the same user induces an inequality per-
ceived by this user. The labels “L” and “R” on an arrow indicate to which side of this
inequality (LHS and RHS respectively) the other user contributes to. As can be seen
the labels alternates in each subsequent inequality.
4.4.2 Counter-Example for 3 Resources
The above theorem establishes that when there are only two resources, the FIP
property holds, and consequently an NE exists. This holds for the general case
of user-specific payoff functions. Below we show a counter-example that the FIP
property does not necessarily hold for 3 resources/colors or more.
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time step A B C D
0 b p p b
1 b → r
2 p → r
3 b → r
4 p → r
5 r → p
6 r → b
7 r → b
8 r → b
9 p → b
10 b → p
11 b → p
Table 4.1: 3-color counter example.
Example 4.4. Suppose we have three colors to assign, denoted by r (red), p (purple),
and b (blue). Consider a network topology shown in Figure 4.3, where we will
primarily focus on nodes A, B, C and D. In addition to node C, node A is also
connected to Ar, Ap and Ab nodes of colors red, green and blue, respectively. Br,
Bp, Bb, Cr, Cp, Cb, and Dr, Dp, Db and similarly defined and illustrated in Figure
4.3. Note that these sets may not be disjoint, e.g., a single node may contribute to
both Ar and Br, and so on.
Consider now the following sequence of improvement updates involving only nodes
A, B, C, and D, i.e., within this sequence none of the other nodes change color (note
that this is possible in an asynchronous improvement path), where the notation
s1 → s2 denotes a color change from s1 to s2 and at time 0 the initial color assignment
is given.
We see that this sequence of color changes form a loop, i.e., all nodes return to
the same color they had when the loop started. For this to be an improvement loop
such that each color change results in improved payoff, it suffices for the following
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sets of conditions to hold (here we assume all users have the same payoff function
and have suppressed the superscript i in gir(), and the notation “>k” denotes that
the improvement occurs at time k):
gr(Ar + 1) >1 gb(Ab + 1) > gb(Ab + 2) >9 gp(Ap + 1) >5 gr(Ar + 2) ;
gr(Br + 1) >2 gp(Bp + 2) >11 gb(Bb + 1) >7 gr(Br + 2) ;
gb(Cb + 3) >8 gr(Cr + 1) > gr(Cr + 4) >4 gp(Cp + 1) >10 gb(Cb + 4) ;
gr(Dr + 1) >3 gb(Db + 1) >6 gr(Dr + 2)
It is straightforward to verify the sufficiency of these conditions by following a node’s
sequence of changes. To complete this counter example, it remains to show that the
above set of inequalities are feasible given appropriate choices of Ax, Bx, Cx and Dx,
x ∈ {r, p, b}. There are many such choices; one example is Ax = 5, Bx = 3, Cx =
7, Dx = 1, for all x ∈ {r, p, b}. With such a choice, and substituting them into
the earlier set of inequalities and through proper reordering, we obtain the following
single chain of inequalities:
gr(2) > gb(2) > gr(3) > gr(4) > gp(5) > gb(4) > gr(5) > gr(6)
> gb(6) > gb(7) > gp(6) > gr(7) > gb(10) > gr(8) > gr(11) > gp(8) > gb(11)
It should be obvious that this chain of inequalities can be easily satisfied by the right
choices of non-increasing payoff functions.
It is easy to see how if we have more than 3 colors, this loop will still be an
improving loop as long as the above inequalities hold. This means that for 3 colors
or more the FIP property does not hold in general. Note that the updates in this

















Figure 4.3: A counter example of 3 colors: nodes A, B, C, and D are connected as shown; in
addition, node W , W ∈ {A,B, C,D}, is connected to Wx other nodes of color x ∈
{r, p, b} as shown.
4.5 Existence of a Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium
In this section we examine what graph properties will guarantee the existence of a
NE. Specifically, we show that for a network congestion game defined on graphs that
are (1) complete, (2) in the form of a tree, or (3) in the form of a loop, a pure strategy
NE always exists with user-specific payoff functions that are non-increasing in the
number of interfering users. Below we present these results in sequence. We will also
give counter examples to show that a pure strategy NE does not generally exist in
such a game when the network graph is directed or when the payoff functions are non-
monotonic. In addition to the results presented here, we believe a pure strategy NE
exists in a general undirected graph (i.e., Theorem 4.8 holds for a general undirected
graph, not just trees). Unfortunately, a formal proof remains elusive to this point.
We continue to pursue this in our on-going research.
4.5.1 Existence of pure strategy NE on an undirected graph
Theorem 4.5. When the graph is complete, a NE always exists for the network
congestion game defined on this graph.
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This theorem is trivially true. It is simply a direct consequence of known results
on the standard CG: in a complete graph every node is every other node’s neighbor,
therefore a NCG reduces to the original CG, thus this result. Furthermore, for the
same reason when the graph is complete the FIP property also holds.
We next show that a pure strategy NE exists when the underlying network graph
is given by a tree. Let ΓN denote a network congestion game with N players; GN
the underlying N -player network, where players are indexed by 1, 2, ..., N and the
payoff functions gir(n
i
r) are nonincreasing. Recall that n
i
r(σ) denotes the number of
neighbors of user i (excluding i) playing strategy r.
Lemma 4.6. If every network congestion game with N players (ΓN) and user specific
non-increasing payoff functions has at least one pure strategy NE, then the (N + 1)-
player network congestion game (denoted as ΓN+1) formed by connecting a new player
with index N + 1 to a single player in the N-player network GN , has at least one
pure strategy NE.
Proof. By assumption ΓN has a pure strategy NE denoted by σ = {σ1, σ2, · · · , σN}.
Suppose ΓN is in such an NE. Now connect player N + 1 to a single player in GN .
Call this player j and the resulting network GN+1. This is illustrated in Figure 4.4.
Let player N + 1 select its best response strategy:




r (σ) + 1),
where nN+1r is defined on the extended network GN+1, and takes on the value of 1
or 0 depending on whether player j selects strategy r or not. We now consider three
cases depending on j’s strategy change in response to the change in network from
GN to GN+1.
Case 1: σj 6= ro. In this case N + 1 selected a resource different from j’s, so j
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has no incentive to change its strategy in response to the addition of player N + 1.
In turn player N + 1 will remain in ro as this is its best response, and no other
players are affected by this single-link network extension. Thus the strategy profile
(σ1, · · · , σN , ro) is a pure strategy NE for the game ΓN+1.
Case 2: σj = σN+1 = ro, and player j’s best response to the change from GN
to GN+1 with player N + 1 selecting ro remains σj = ro. That is, even with the
additional interfering neighbor N + 1, the best choice for j remains ro. In this case
again we reach a pure strategy NE for the game ΓN+1 with the same argument as in
Case 1.
Case 3: σj = σN+1 = ro, and player j’s best response to this change is to move
away from strategy ro. In this case more players may in turn change strategies.
Suppose we hold player (N + 1)’s strategy fixed at ro. Consider now a new network
congestion game Γ̄N , defined on the original network GN , but with the following
modified payoff functions for r ∈ R and i ∈ I:
ḡir(n
i






r + 2) if i = j, r = ro
gir(n
i
r + 1) otherwise
.
In words, the game Γ̄N is almost the same as the original game ΓN , the only difference
being that the addition of player (N + 1) and its strategy ro is built into player j’s
modified payoff function.
By assumption of the lemma, this game with N players has a pure strategy NE
and denote that by σ̄. Suppose σ̄ is reached in the network GN with player (N + 1)
fixed at σN+1 = ro. If we have σ̄j = ro, then obviously player (N + 1) has no
incentive to change its strategy because as far as it is concerned its environment has
not changed at all. In turn no player in GN will change its strategy because they
are already in an NE with (N + 1) held at ro. If σ̄j 6= ro, then player (N + 1) has
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even less incentive to change its strategy because its payoff for using ro is no worse
than before since j moved away with payoff functions being non-increasing, and at
the same time its payoff for using any other resource is no better. Again ro is player
(N + 1)’s best response.
In either case a new NE, the strategy profile (σ̄, ro), is reached for the game
ΓN+1.
Remark 4.7. Note that in the above lemma, the network GN itself does not have to
be a tree. The lemma states that as long as a NE exists for one network, then by
adding one more node through a single link, an NE exists in the new network.
Theorem 4.8. A network congestion game defined over a tree network with non-
increasing player-specific payoff functions has at least one pure strategy NE.
Proof. The proof is easily obtained by noting that any tree can be constructed by
starting from a single node and adding one node (connected through a single link)
at a time. Formally, we prove this by induction on N . Start with a single player
indexed by 1. This game has a pure strategy NE, in which the player selects σ1 =
argmaxr∈Rg
1
r(1) for any payoff functions. Assume that any N -player game ΓN over a
tree GN with any set of non-increasing payoff functions has at least one pure strategy
NE. Any tree GN+1 may be constructed by adding one more leaf node to some other
tree GN by connecting it to only one of the players in GN . Lemma 1 guarantees that
such a formation will result in a game with at least one pure strategy NE.
Theorem 4.9. If the network is in the form of a loop and user payoff functions are
identical for a given resource, then there always exists a pure strategy Nash equilib-












Figure 4.4: Adding one more player to the network GN with a single link.
Proof. We know from Theorem 4.3 that when there are only 2 colors an NE always
exists. Assume there are at least 3 colors to choose from. As payoff functions are
non-user specific, we will suppress the superscript i in the function gir(). Note that
there always exist three colors r, b, p that have the highest single-user occupancy
payoff values; suppose we have
gr(1) ≥ gb(1) ≥ gp(1)
If the loop has an even number of nodes then compare gr(3) with gb(1). If gr(3) ≥
gb(1), then assigning r to all nodes will result in an NE; if gb(1) ≥ gr(3) then assigning
r and b alternately will result in an NE.
Now consider the case where the loop has an odd number of nodes, labeled from
1 to 2n + 1, where node i is connected to node i + 1 and node 2n + 1 is connected
to node 1. Again we see that if gr(3) ≥ gb(1) then assigning r to all nodes results in
an NE.
Assume now gb(1) ≥ gr(3) and consider the following assignment. Assign r and
b alternately to nodes from 2 up to 2n, so that nodes 2 and 2n are both colored r.
It remains to determine the coloring of nodes 1 and 2n + 1. We have the following
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User 3 /User 1,2 (1, 1) (1, 2) (2, 1) (2, 2)
1 5, 5, 3 5, 4, 5 4, 5, 5 4, 4, 2
2 2, 2, 4 2, 6, 6 6, 2, 6 6, 6, 1
Table 4.2: 3-color counter example.
four cases (under the condition gb(1) ≥ gr(3)): (1) gb(2) ≥ gr(2) and gb(2) ≥ gp(1):
in this case (b, b) assignment to nodes 1 and 2n + 1 will result in an overall NE.
(2) gb(2) ≥ gr(2) and gb(2) < gp(1): in this case either (b, p) or (p, b) for nodes 1
and 2n + 1 will result in an overall NE. (3) gb(2) < gr(2) and gr(2) ≥ gp(1): in this
case either (b, r) or (r, b) for node 1 and 2n + 1 will result in an overall NE. (4)
gb(2) < gr(2) and gr(2) < gp(1): in this case either (b, p) or (p, b) for nodes 1 and
2n + 1 will result in an overall NE.
Therefore in all cases we have shown an NE exists.
4.5.2 Counter Example of Non-monotonic Payoff Functions
Below we show that a pure strategy NE may not exist when the network graph
is undirected but the payoff function is non-monotonic, even when they are non-user
specific.
Example 4.10. Consider a 3-user, 2-channel network given in Figure 4.5. The payoff
functions have the following property
g2(2) > g1(2) > g2(1) > g1(3) > g1(1) > g2(3) .
One example of this is when g1(1) = 2, g1(2) = 5, g1(3) = 3, g2(1) = 4, g2(2) =
6, g2(3) = 1. The game matrix corresponding to these payoff functions are given




Figure 4.5: Counter example of non-monotonic payoff functions
4.5.3 Counter Example of a Directed Graph
Below we show that a pure strategy NE may not exist when the network graph
is directed.
Example 4.11. Consider a 4-user, 3-channel network whose graph is given in Figure
4.6. It can be shown that a pure strategy NE does not exist when the payoff functions
are non-increasing and have the following property.
g3(1) > g2(1) > g2(2) > g3(2) > g1(1) > g1(2) > g2(3) > g1(3) > g2(4) > g1(4) > g3(3) > g3(4) .
We do not include an example game matrix for brevity. We invite an interested




Figure 4.6: Counter-example for directed graphs
4.6 Sufficient Conditions on User Payoff Functions
In this section we examine what properties on the user payoff functions will guar-
antee the existence of an NE. Specifically, we show that for general network graphs,
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an NE always exists if (1) there is one resource with a dominating payoff function
(much larger than the others), or (2) different resources present the same type of
payoff for users. Moreover, in the case of (2) the game has the FIP property. We
note that case (2) is of particular practical interest and relevance, as this case in
the context of spectrum sharing translates to evenly dividing a spectrum band into
sub-bands, each providing users with the same bandwidth and data rate. Below we
present and prove these results.
Theorem 4.12. For a general network graph, if there exists a resource r and its pay-
off function is such that gir(Kd + 1) ≥ gis(1), where Kd = max{|Ki|, i = 1, 2, · · · , N},
for all s ∈ 1, 2, · · · , R and all i ∈ I, then a Nash Equilibrium exists.
Here Kd is the maximum node degree in the network, i.e., the maximum possible
number of users sharing the same resource. In words, this theorem says that if there
exists a resource whose payoff “dominates” all other resources, then an NE exists.
This is a rather trivial result; an obvious NE is when all users share the dominating
resource.
Theorem 4.13. For a general undirected network graph, if all resources have iden-
tical non-increasing payoff functions for any given user, i.e., for all r ∈ R and
i ∈ I, we have gir(n) = gi(n) for n = 1, 2, · · · , N and some non-increasing function
gi(·), then there exists a Nash Equilibrium, and the game has the finite improvement
property. Note that the payoffs can remain user-specific.
Proof. We prove this theorem by using a potential function argument.
Recall that user i’s total payoff under the strategy profile σ is given by (here we
have suppressed the subscript r since all resources are identical):
gi(σ) = g(ni(σ) + 1), ni(σ) = |{j : σj = σi, j ∈ Ki}|(4.14)
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where σi ∈ R since we have limited our attention to the case where each user can
select only one resource at a time.









where the indicator function 1(A) = 1 if A is true and 0 otherwise. For a particular
strategy profile σ this function φ is the sum of all pairs of users that are connected
(neighbors of each other) and have chosen the same resource under this strategy
profile. Viewed in a graph, this function is the total number of edges connecting
nodes with the same color.
We see that every time user i improves its payoff by switching from strategy σi to
σ
′
i, and reducing n
i(σ−i, σi) to ni(σ−i, σ
′
i) (g
i is a non-increasing function), the value
of φ() strictly decreases accordingly7. As this function is bounded from below, this
means that in this case the game has the FIP property so this process eventually
converges to a fixed point which is a Nash Equilibrium.
4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we have considered an extension to the classical definition of con-
gestion games by allowing resources to be reused among non-interfering users. This
is a much more appropriate model to use in the context of wireless networks and
spectrum sharing where due to decay of wireless signals over a distance, spatial reuse
is frequently exploited to increase spectrum utilization.
The resulting game, congestion game with resource reuse, is a generalization to the
original congestion game. We have shown that when there are only two resources
7It’s easily seen that a non-increasing function G(
∑
i,j∈K 1(i ∈ Kj)1(σi = σj)) is an ordinal potential function of
this game as its value improves each time a user’s individual payoff is improved thereby decreasing the value of its
argument.
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and users can only use one at a time, then the game has the finite improvement
property; the same is shown to be false in general when there are three or more
resources. We further showed a number of conditions on the network graph as well
as the user payoff functions under which the game has an NE. Perhaps most relevant
to spectrum sharing is the result that when all resources present the same payoff to
users (e.g., all channels are of the same bandwidth and data rate for all users), then
the game has the finite improvement property and an NE exists.
CHAPTER 5
Conclusion and Future Work
5.1 Conclusion and Future Work
In this dissertation, we studied a few problems regarding resource allocation prob-
lems within the contexts of game theory and stochastic control. These problems were
motivated by applications within communication networks. We now summarize the
main results before providing some potential future research on these problems.
For problem (OP) analyzed in Chapter 2 , we considered the case that the prob-
ability of each channel being in an idle state is known a priori to the secondary
user. We formulated a dynamic programming problem and we searched for stochas-
tic control techniques which would help us to solve the problem. The goal was to
maximize expected reward during the horizon whether infinite or finite. Our strategy
was fairly robust in case that the a priori distribution is not exact. We proved that
in case that channels are independent , totally equal two-state Markov models with
transition probabilities independent of time and at the same time bursty, the optimal
policy for the secondary user is to probe the channels in a greedy way meaning at
each step picking the arm which has the highest probability of being idle (highest
instantaneous expected return). This result largely improves on the previous results
where results were established for the cases that either there are only two arms or
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if there is a tighter condition than arms being bursty imposed on the problem. We
also found a counter-example to show that in the case that arms are not bursty, the
greedy policy is not optimal effectively solving a problem which was open for a while.
In Chapter 3, we examined problem (MC-OP) which is a direct generalization to
the first problem. In this problem we assumed the controller can pick exactly a fixed
number of arms to play at every time moment. We studied finding optimal policy
and strategies which maximize expected reward in the specific horizon subject to the
constraint of selecting a specific number of arms at a time.
For the network congestion game problem in Chapter 4, we examined a problem
which was a generalization to congestions games where several players in a game
have to choose their resource in such a way that to maximize their reward. The
reward function is a utility function defined for each user , and is decreasing in the
number of users who have been using that same resource. Many problems can be
studied on such games, the most significant of them is to study whether or not there
always exists a Nash Equilibrium on these graphs. We proved in certain scenarios,
specially when the number of resources is only 2 , this game always has a Nash
Equilibrium point. For certain geometries and restrictions on the utility functions
we also succeeded in proving existence of Nash equilibrium points. The proof was
based on sequential change of colors in the nodes so that the graph will eventually
be colored in a Nash equilibrium state.
5.1.1 Future Work
Here we discuss some potential future work on the two main problems that were
examined in this thesis.
For problems (OP) and (MC-OP), some open problems include the following:
81
• Given that the optimality results were proven for the case that channels are
independent, equal and bursty, many important questions remain here. One
of the most important and natural questions to be addressed is how would the
optimal policy change when the channels are not bursty. This case is a very
realistic and important case which its study will pave the way for future progress
on the solution to the general case of multi-armed restless bandit problem, a
problem which has been proved to be PSPACE-hard while at the same time it
has always been a subject of attention to the stochastic control community.
• Another exciting possible line of research for future is a special case of imperfect
sensing for secondary user. Zhao and Krishnamachari consider the channels to
be simple gilbert-elliot channels and also study a more specific problem where
there are only 2 channels available to secondary user. In this problem which
we call it ”Sensing with Side Information” they consider absolutely no penalty
for transferring through a busy channel interfering with primary user so the
secondary user , would prefer to transfer through the channel he probes no
matter the outcome of the probation shows the channel to be busy or available.
In their work , they have proved subject to certain conditions on probability of
false alarm and also missed detection , one can prove greedy policy (myopic)
in choosing channels (with respect to probability of their availability) to be
optimal. It is an interesting research to see if in this scenario , when we have
multiple channels , myopic policy will still be optimal.
There will be two exciting problems to be targeted here. First one is that in
such case , what would be the optimal policy for probing and transmitting
for secondary user. The complication is that at each time slot , not only he
has to choose a channel to probe , but depending on the outcome of probing
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and the current state of prob- ability vector (again it is a well-known fact that
probability of occupancy vector is sufficient statistic for the secondary user to
decide on which channel to probe), he has to choose between transmitting signal
and taking the risk of an interference penalty or rather skipping transmitting
through that slot and also giving up on the potential award he could have got
if the channel was available and he transmitted through it.
• the Other exciting problem is to assume secondary user selects one channel and
probes it in the beginning of each time slot and will transmit signal if and only
if the channel is sensed to be available. This assumption reduces complexity
of the problem as secondary user does not need to choose whether he needs
to transmit or not. We consider a certain cost according to interfering with
primary user
• Another exciting case is when secondary user tries to transmit a message while
his message arrival is bursty meaning arrival of information packets at each time
moment happens subject to a certain distribution. The main question here is
that in case that there is certain penalty/cost for probing, what would his
optimal policy for probing be. This means depending on the occupancy vector
of channels which represents the probability of each channel being available at
that time moment, what his optimal probing policy would be which consists of:
1)when to choose a channel to probe and 2)In case that he chooses to probe
a channel which channel should he select to probe in order to maximize his
expected long-run return. The idea for this problem is totally new and given
that there is no previous work on this problem we believe it poses a host of rich
properties to be explored. In reality , it would be naive to consider probing a
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channel being free. At the very least , every time a secondary user probes a
channel , there is a cost associated with tuning to that channel and also the
time wasted to make sure the channel is available or not. When the secondary
user does not have a message waiting he has the choice of choosing a channel
and probing it , which will provide him with further information regarding the
status of that channel in the future time slots as well as a cost associated with
this probing and also a choice of not probing any channel which would not cost
him anything at all and as well it provides him with no further information
regarding occupancy probability in any of the channels. On the other hand ,
even if he has a message waiting , he might opt not to probe any channel as
the channels might have such little occupancy probability that cost of probing
one of them would not be justified with the respective chance to transfer a
message and knowledge acquired regarding further probability of occupancy for
that probed channel.
Potential future work on the network congestion game problem follows:
• An exciting possibility is to find out existence of Nash equilibrium in more
general cases where there are more than two resources available for the users.
While our intelligent method for proving existence of Nash equilibrium was
creative , it is not applicable to the case that there are more than two channels
as FIP property does not hold without major change for the case of more than
two resources available.
• Another exciting possibility for research on this problem is to consider different
geometries which existence of Nash equilibrium could be proven and at the
same time , it’s existence is useful. While we focused on specific geometries like
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graphs in the form of a simple loop or a tree , there are more diverse geometries
to be studied which arise from real life situations. Rather than studying each
of them as a special and isolated case , creating a smart method that addresses
multiple scenarios simultaneously is of great importance.
• Another important question is to study quality of Nash equilibrium point and
how good it is indeed for the players of the game. While we worked on estab-
lishing results regarding existence of Nash equilibrium , finding a measure that
describes how good an equilibrium is and assessing different equilibrium points






Appendix for Chapter 2
Proof of Lemma 2.6:
The LHS of the inequality represents the expected reward of a policy (referred to
as L below) that probes in the sequence of channels 1 followed by n, n− 1, · · · , and
then 1 again, and so on, plus an extra reward of 1; the RHS represents the expected
reward of a policy (referred to as R below) that probes in the sequence of channels n
followed by n− 1, · · · , and 1 and then n again, and so on. It helps to imagine lining
up the n channels along a circle in the sequence of n, n − 1, · · · , 1, clock-wise, and
thus L’s starting position is 1, R’s starting position is n, exactly one spot ahead of
L clock-wise. Each will cycle around the circle till time T .
Now for any realization of the channel conditions (or any sample path of the
system), consider the sequence of “0”s and “1”s that these two policies see, and
consider the position they are on the circle. The reward a policy gets along a given
sample path is Rl =
∑T
j=t β
jIh(j)=1 for policy L, where Ihl(j)=1 = 1 if L sees a “1”




similarly defined. There are two cases.
Case (1): the two eventually catch up with each other at some time K ≤ T ,
i.e., at some point they start probing exactly the same channel. From this point on
the two policies behave exactly the same way along the same sample path, and the
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reward they obtain from this point on is exactly the same. Therefore in this case we
only need to compare the rewards (L has an extra 1) leading up to this point.
Case (2): The two never manage to meet within the horizon T . In this case we
need to compare the rewards for the entire horizon (from t to T ).
We will consider Case (1) first. There are only two possibilities for the two policies
to meet: (Case 1.a) either L has seen exactly one more “0” than R in its sequence, or
(Case 1.b) R has seen exactly n− 1 more “0”s than L. This is because the moment
we see a “0” we will move to the next channel on the circle. L is only one position
behind R, so one more “0” will put it at exactly the same position as R. The same
with R moving n− 1 more positions ahead to catch up with L.
Case (1.a): L sees exactly one more “0” than R in its sequence. The extra “0”
necessarily occurs at exactly time K, t ≤ K ≤ T , meaning that at K, L sees a “0”
and R sees a “1”. From t to K, if we write the sequence of rewards (zeros and ones)
under L and R, we observe the following: between t and K both L and R have equal
number of zeros, while for ∀t′ = t, t + 1, . . . , K − 1, the number of zeros up to time t′
is less (or no more) for L than for R. In other words, L and R see the same number
of “0”s, but L’s is always lagging behind (or no earlier). That is, for every “0” R
sees, L has a matching “0” that occurs no earlier than R’s “0.” This means that if we
denote by Rl(t1, t2) the rewards accumulated between t1 and t2, then for the rewards
in [t,K − 1], we have Rl(t, t′) ≥ Rr(t, t′), for ∀t′ ≤ K − 1, while Rl(K,K) = βK and
Rr(K, K) = 0. Finally by definition we have Rl(K +1, T ) = Rr(K +1, T ). Therefore
overall we have 1 + Rl(t, T ) ≥ Rr(t, T ), proving the above inequality.
Case (1.b): R sees n − 1 more “0”s than L does. The comparison is simpler.
We only need to note that R’s “0”s must again precedes (or be no later than) L’s
since otherwise we will return to Case (1.a). Therefore we have Rl ≥ Rr, and thus
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1 + Rl ≥ Rr is also true.
We now consider Case (2). The argument is essentially the same. In this case the
two don’t get to meet, but they are on their way, meaning that either L has exactly
the same “0”s as R and their positions are no earlier (corresponding to Case (1.a)),
or R has more “0”s than L (but not up to n − 1) and their positions are no later
than L’s (corresponding to Case (1.b)). So either way we have 1 + Rl ≥ Rr.
The proof is thus complete.
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APPENDIX B
Appendix for Chapter 3
Proof of Lemma 3: We would like to show
(A) : 1 + W kt (ω2, · · · , ωn, ω1) ≥ W kt (ω1, · · · , ωn)
(B) : W kt (ω1, · · · , ωj, y, x, ωj+3, · · · , ωn) ≥
W kt (ω1, · · · , x, y, ωj+3, · · · , ωn),
where x ≥ y, 0 ≤ j ≤ n−2, and j = 0 implies W kt (y, x, ω3, · · · , ωn) ≥ W kt (x, y, ω3, · · · , ωn).
The two inequalities (A) and (B) will be shown together using an induction on
t. For t = T , part (A) is true because LHS = 1 + ω1 +
∑n
i=n−k+2 ωi ≥ ωn−k+1 +
∑n
i=n−k+2 ωi = RHS. Part (B) is obviously true for t = T since x ≥ y.
Suppose (A) and (B) are both true for t + 1, · · · , T . Consider time t, and we will
prove (A) first. Note that in the next step, channel 1 is selected by the action on the
LHS of (A) but not by the RHS, while channel n− k + 1 is selected by the RHS of
(A) but not by the LHS. Other than this difference both sides select the same set of
channels indexed n− k + 2, · · · , n. We now consider four possible cases in terms of
the realizations of channels 1 and n− k + 1.
Case (A.1): channels 1 and n − k + 1 have the state realizations “0” and “1”,
respectively.
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We will use a sample-path argument. Note that while these two channels are not
both observed by either side, the realizations hold for the underlying sample path
regardless. In particular, even though the LHS does not select channel n−k +1 and
therefore does not get to actually observe the realization of “1”, the fact remains
that channel n − k + 1 is indeed in state 1 under this realization, and therefore
its future expected reward must reflect this. It follows that under this realization
channel n−k +1 will have probability p11 for the next time step even though we did
not get to observe the state 1. The same is true for the RHS. This argument applies
to the other three cases and is thus not repeated.
Conditioned on this realization, the LHS and RHS are evaluated as follows (de-
noted as {LHS|(0,1)} and {RHS|(0,1)}, respectively):
{LHS|(0,1)} = 1 +
∑
n−k+2≤i≤n
ωi + β ·
∑
ln−k+2,··· ,ln∈{0,1}
q(ln−k+2, · · · , ln) ·
W kt+1(p01[k −
∑
li], τ(ω2), · · · , τ(ωn−k+1) = p11, p11[
∑
li]) ;
{RHS|(0,1)} = 1 +
∑
n−k+2≤i≤n
ωi + β ·
∑
ln−k+2,··· ,ln∈{0,1}
q(ln−k+2, · · · , ln) ·
W kt+1(p01[k −
∑




Case (A.2): channels 1 and n − 1 + 1 have the state realizations “1” and “1”,
respectively.
{LHS|(1,1)} = 1 + 1 +
∑
n−k+2≤i≤n
ωi + β ·
∑
ln−k+2,··· ,ln∈{0,1}
q(ln−k+2, · · · , ln) ·
W kt+1(p01[k −
∑
li − 1], τ(ω2), · · · , τ(ωn−k+1) = p11, p11[
∑
li + 1]) ;
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{RHS|(1,1)} = 1 +
∑
n−k+2≤i≤n
ωi + β ·
∑
ln−k+2,··· ,ln∈{0,1}
q(ln−k+2, · · · , ln) ·
W kt+1(p01[k −
∑






ωi + β ·
∑
ln−k+2,··· ,ln∈{0,1}
q(ln−k+2, · · · , ln) ·
W kt+1(p01[k −
∑
li − 1], τ(ω2), · · · , τ(ωn−k), p11, p11[
∑
li + 1])
= {LHS|(1,1)} − 1 ≤ {LHS|(1,1)}
where the first inequality is due to the induction hypothesis of (B).





ωi + β ·
∑
ln−k+2,··· ,ln∈{0,1}
q(ln−k+2, · · · , ln) ·
W kt+1(p01[k −
∑
li], τ(ω1) = p01, τ(ω2), · · · , τ(ωn−k), p11[
∑
li]) ;
{LHS|(0,0)} = 1 +
∑
n−k+2≤i≤n
ωi + β ·
∑
ln−k+2,··· ,ln∈{0,1}
q(ln−k+2, · · · , ln) ·
W kt+1(p01[k −
∑






ωi + β ·
∑
ln−k+2,··· ,ln∈{0,1}
q(ln−k+2, · · · , ln) ·
W kt+1(p01[k −
∑






ωi + β ·
∑
ln−k+2,··· ,ln∈{0,1}
q(ln−k+2, · · · , ln) ·
(
1 + W kt+1(p01[k −
∑







ωi + β ·
∑
ln−k+2,··· ,ln∈{0,1}
q(ln−k+2, · · · , ln) ·
W kt+1(p01, p01[k −
∑




where the first inequality is due to the induction hypothesis of (B), the last inequality
due to the induction hypothesis of (A). Also, the second inequality utilizes the total
probability over the distribution q(ln−k+2, · · · , ln) and the fact that β ≤ 1.





ωi + β ·
∑
ln−k+2,··· ,ln∈{0,1}
q(ln−k+2, · · · , ln) ·
W kt+1(p01[k −
∑
li], τ(ω1) = p11, τ(ω2), · · · , τ(ωn−k), p11[
∑
li])
{LHS|(1,0)} = 1 + 1 +
∑
n−k+2≤i≤n
ωi + β ·
∑
ln−k+2,··· ,ln∈{0,1}
q(ln−k+2, · · · , ln) ·
W kt+1(p01[k −
∑
li − 1], τ(ω2), · · · , τ(ωn−k), τ(ωn−k+1) = p01, p11[
∑
li + 1])
≥ 1 + 1 +
∑
n−k+2≤i≤n
ωi + β ·
∑
ln−k+2,··· ,ln∈{0,1}
q(ln−k+2, · · · , ln) ·
W kt+1(p01[k −
∑
li − 1], τ(ω2), · · · , τ(ωn−k), p11[
∑




ωi + β ·
∑
ln−k+2,··· ,ln∈{0,1}
q(ln−k+2, · · · , ln) ·
(
1 + W kt+1(p01[k −
∑
li − 1], τ(ω2), · · · , τ(ωn−k), p11[
∑





ωi + β ·
∑
ln−k+2,··· ,ln∈{0,1}
q(ln−k+2, · · · , ln) ·
W kt+1(p01[k −
∑






ωi + β ·
∑
ln−k+2,··· ,ln∈{0,1}
q(ln−k+2, · · · , ln) ·
W kt+1(p01[k −
∑
li], p11, τ(ω2), · · · , τ(ωn−k), p11[
∑
li])
= 1 + {RHS|(1,0)} ≥ {RHS|(1,0)}
where the first and last inequalities are due to the induction hypothesis of (B), the
third due to the induction hypothesis of (A).
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With these four cases, we conclude the induction step of proving (A). We next
prove the induction step of (B). We consider three cases in terms of whether x and
y are among the top k channels to be selected in the next step.
Case (B.1): both x and y belong to the top k positions on both sides. In this case
there is no difference between the LHS and RHS along each sample path, since both
channels will be selected and the result will be the same.
Case (B.2): neither x nor y is among the top k positions on either side. This




ωi + β ·
∑
ln−k+2,··· ,ln∈{0,1}
q(ln−k+2, · · · , ln) ·
W kt+1(p01[k −
∑






ωi + β ·
∑
ln−k+2,··· ,ln∈{0,1}
q(ln−k+2, · · · , ln) ·
W kt+1(p01[k −
∑
li], τ(ω1), · · · , τ(ωj), τ(x), τ(y), τ(ωj+3), · · · , p11[
∑
li]) ≥ LHS
where the last inequality is due to the monotonicity of τ() and the induction hypoth-
esis of (B).
Case (B.3): exactly one of the two belongs to the the top k channels on each side.
This implies that j = n − k − 1. By the linearity of the function W kt we have the
following:
W kt (ω1, · · · , ωn−k−1, y, x, ωn−k+2, · · · , ωn)−W kt (ω1, · · · , ωn−k−1, x, y, ωn−k+2, · · · , ωn)
= (x− y)(W kt (ω1, · · · , ωn−k−1, 0, 1, ωn−k+2, · · · , ωn)
−W kt (ω1, · · · , ωn−k−1, 1, 0, ωn−k+2, · · · , ωn))
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However, we have




ωi + β ·
∑
ln−k+2,··· ,ln∈{0,1}
q(ln−k+2, · · · , ln) ·
W kt+1(p01[k −
∑





ωi + β ·
∑
ln−k+2,··· ,ln∈{0,1}
q(ln−k+2, · · · , ln) · (1 + W kt+1(p01[k −
∑
li − 1], τ(ω1), · · · ,
τ(ωn−k−1), p11[
∑




ωi + β ·
∑
ln−k+2,··· ,ln∈{0,1}
q(ln−k+2, · · · , ln) ·
(
1 + W kt+1(p01[k −
∑







ωi + β ·
∑
ln−k+2,··· ,ln∈{0,1}
q(ln−k+2, · · · , ln) ·
W kt+1(p01[k −
∑
li − 1], τ(ω1), · · · , τ(ωn−k−1), p01, p11[
∑
li + 1])
= W kt (ω1, · · · , ωn−k−1, 0, 1, ωn−k+2, · · · , ωn)
Since x ≥ y, we have LHS ≥ RHS in the first equation. This concludes the
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